THE ROYAL THAI ARMY/MARINES/INFANTRY, CHAI YO! Options

[VAMAN]

I have read in another forum that the Thai soldiers in black uniforms are actually a para-military unit called Taharn Phran. They are not Thai Army soldiers.

[VAMAN]

(IMG:http://i279.photobucket.com/albums/kk152/analayo/Thai-Cambodian%20stanoff/X6806079-63.jpg)
Taharn Phran, a Thai para-military unit, deploying on the border.

(IMG:http://i198.photobucket.com/albums/aa78/lancero44/julho1/20080724073815ENLUS0142223012168850.jpg)
A Thai soldier walks up to a pagoda, as Cambodian soldiers (background), rest on guard near Preah Vihear temple near Thai border in Preah Vihear province, Cambodia, 23 July 2008. Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Namhong, claiming he feared an 'imminent state of war', appealed to the 15-member UN Security Council to intervene in the Thai-Cambodian dispute over conflicting claims to territory adjacent to the Preah Vihear temple, perched on a cliff that partly defines the two neighbouring countries' common border.

(IMG:http://img237.imageshack.us/img237/351/76431851xr8.jpg)
Thai soldiers patrol near the Cekakiri Svarak pagoda of the Preah Vihear temple, about 245 km (152 miles) north of Phnom Penh, July 25, 2008. REUTERS/Sukree Sukplang (THAILAND)

This post has been edited by VAMAN: Aug 29 2008, 12:01 AM

[VAMAN]

Alright looks like Thais don't like their military or maybe Thais in AF they are less nationalistic.

[VAMAN]

Sunday, 3 August 2008 10:06 UK

Thais accused over new temple row

Cambodia has accused Thai troops of occupying a temple complex on Cambodian land, threatening to escalate a row over a separate, disputed temple.

About 70 Thais have been at the 13th Century Ta Moan temple complex since Thursday, the Cambodians say.

The Thai foreign ministry has denied any troops have moved into the area.

The two nations have for weeks been locked in a military stand-off over disputed land further east, around the ancient Preah Vihear temples.

High-level diplomacy has been taking place to resolve the Preah Vihear dispute, which revolves around border areas drawn up by French cartographers a century ago.

And an agreement was reached, following a meeting between foreign ministers from both countries, to reduce troop numbers near the temple.

Prevented access

But Maj Sim Sokha, a Cambodian border-protection officer, told reporters on Sunday that Thai soldiers had been making moves hundreds of miles west of Preah Vihear.

He said the Thai troops had been deployed in an 80m (262ft) radius around the Ta Moan Thom temple ground, and had prevented Cambodian troops from entering.

He said about 40 Cambodian soldiers were in close proximity to the Thai troops, but had been ordered to exercise restraint while the government tries to resolve the issue with Thailand.

"[Thai troops] said they will pull back only when the issue near Preah Vihear temple is resolved," he told the Associated Press by telephone.

The Ta Moan complex is in Cambodia's Oddar Meanchey province, which shares much of its border with the Thai province of Surin.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7539412.stm

[VAMAN]

Thai-Cambodian Standoff

(IMG:http://img57.imageshack.us/img57/9599/rtakr1.jpg)
Commander of the 2nd Army of Royal Thai Army observing the dispute area yesterday. Photo by Posttoday.com

(IMG:http://i279.photobucket.com/albums/kk152/analayo/Thai-Cambodian%20stanoff/X6806079-12.jpg)
Thai artillery station near Thai-Cambodian border.

(IMG:http://img301.imageshack.us/img301/5392/x680607992zr7.jpg)

(IMG:http://img397.imageshack.us/img397/1987/x680607993zx0.jpg)

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(IMG:http://img158.imageshack.us/img158/4459/x680607995sd8.jpg)

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(IMG:http://img158.imageshack.us/img158/5828/x680607997kb8.jpg)

[AnAttA]

Alright looks like Thais don't like their military or maybe Thais in AF they are less nationalistic.

nah. they just dont want to show it off. i've six pack abe muscles and 9 inches long d!ck. i'm not telling anyone here. i like to keep it to myself. (IMG:style_emoticons/default/biggthumpup.gif)

[VAMAN]

nah. they just dont want to show it off. i've six pack abe muscles and 9 inches long d!ck. i'm not telling anyone here. i like to keep it to myself. (IMG:style_emoticons/default/biggthumpup.gif)

Nice reply. (IMG:style_emoticons/default/biggthumpup.gif)

[VAMAN]

EDITORIAL
The military must adapt

There is much to learn from previous counter-insurgent successes against communists and Malay separatists

Published on January 18, 2008

It doesn't take an expert to tell that the Thai military is in need of a drastic overhaul, something that it has consistently failed to do over the years. The armed forces personnel remain high at about 300,000 almost two decades after the end of the Cold War and victories over the communist insurgency in the late 1980s and the previous generation of armed separatists in the South. Instead of reforming and transforming into a leaner, more effective professional fighting force capable of meeting changing national security requirements, the military has deteriorated into a bloated bureaucracy. Troops are poorly trained and are commanded by desk-bound officers with little or no combat experience. Hundreds of generals have no clear job descriptions.

Last year, an exasperated former Army chief, Gen Sonthi Boonyaratglin, lamented the military's low morale and poor performance as reflected in the worsening situation in the deep South. It was brave of Sonthi to own up to the Army's mistakes and shortcomings. But whether such criticism has led to any effort among the rank and file to right the wrongs, to improve the Army's battle-readiness, remains very much in doubt.

Four years after the beginning of the insurgency by Islamic militants/Malay separatists in the deep South, it is impossible to ignore the failure of the Army to achieve its objectives: to suppress the insurgency, protect the civilian population and restore peace or at least a semblance of law and order in the strife-torn region.

The insurgents are still able to carry out their campaign to terrorise local people through random murders, planting bombs at busy public places, ambushing military convoys, and inflicting heavy casualties on soldiers who have received inadequate training in counter-insurgency tactics.

Even after four years of the struggle against the insurgents, the Army still has not set up rapid deployment forces that can be dispatched to provide reinforcements, rescue wounded soldiers and pursue insurgents.

Soldiers under attack are left to their own devices and the wounded are almost always not rescued in time. Often they are finished off execution-style and they are mutilated or decapitated. Under such circumstances, it is understandable that the tens of thousands of troops in the deep South suffer from low morale.

Employing hit-and-run tactics, insurgents can always hide among the civilian population, plotting more attacks. At the same time, the Army not only lacks good intelligence but also has serious difficulty in keeping its operational plans secret, thus endangering the lives of its own troops. The recent arrest of three Army intelligence officers and seven policemen suspected of spying for the insurgents is unsettling.

The effort by the Army to win the hearts and minds of the people also is not working. Obviously, an Army that is incapable of protecting its own men does not inspire confidence among ordinary people under fire. Locals naturally refuse to cooperate with the authorities for fear of reprisal by ruthless militants.

It is only fair to ask what has the Army learned, if anything, in the past four years? How has it adjusted its tactics and strategies? Porous land and sea borders with Malaysia continue to be largely unguarded - why? Who among the military's top brass will provide the leadership to reform the Army, Navy and Air Force?

How long can this series of military blunders go on before the armed forces loses the will to fight altogether?

It may be true that a lasting peace in the deep South can be achieved through political settlement, through peace talks at the negotiation table. But it cannot be emphasised enough that an effective military - with the will, knowledge and ability to fight insurgents - must go hand in hand with any political initiative.

As a democratic country, Thailand must not be forced to negotiate with hate-filled insurgents, certainly not under fire, and not when innocent civilians continue to be terrorised and victimised. The military has much to learn from Thailand's previous successes in suppressing communist insurgents in the mid-1980s and the previous generation of Malay separatists in the early 1990s. And - if peace is to be restored in the troubled region - it must adopt and adapt much more quickly.

The Nation

[AnAttA]

EDITORIAL
The military must adapt

There is much to learn from previous counter-insurgent successes against communists and Malay separatists

Published on January 18, 2008

It doesn't take an expert to tell that the Thai military is in need of a drastic overhaul, something that it has consistently failed to do over the years. The armed forces personnel remain high at about 300,000 almost two decades after the end of the Cold War and victories over the communist insurgency in the late 1980s and the previous generation of armed separatists in the South. Instead of reforming and transforming into a leaner, more effective professional fighting force capable of meeting changing national security requirements, the military has deteriorated into a bloated bureaucracy. Troops are poorly trained and are commanded by desk-bound officers with little or no combat experience. Hundreds of generals have no clear job descriptions.

Last year, an exasperated former Army chief, Gen Sonthi Boonyaratglin, lamented the military's low morale and poor performance as reflected in the worsening situation in the deep South. It was brave of Sonthi to own up to the Army's mistakes and shortcomings. But whether such criticism has led to any effort among the rank and file to right the wrongs, to improve the Army's battle-readiness, remains very much in doubt.

Four years after the beginning of the insurgency by Islamic militants/Malay separatists in the deep South, it is impossible to ignore the failure of the Army to achieve its objectives: to suppress the insurgency, protect the civilian population and restore peace or at least a semblance of law and order in the strife-torn region.

The insurgents are still able to carry out their campaign to terrorise local people through random murders, planting bombs at busy public places, ambushing military convoys, and inflicting heavy casualties on soldiers who have received inadequate training in counter-insurgency tactics.

Even after four years of the struggle against the insurgents, the Army still has not set up rapid deployment forces that can be dispatched to provide reinforcements, rescue wounded soldiers and pursue insurgents.

Soldiers under attack are left to their own devices and the wounded are almost always not rescued in time. Often they are finished off execution-style and they are mutilated or decapitated. Under such circumstances, it is understandable that the tens of thousands of troops in the deep South suffer from low morale.

Employing hit-and-run tactics, insurgents can always hide among the civilian population, plotting more attacks. At the same time, the Army not only lacks good intelligence but also has serious difficulty in keeping its operational plans secret, thus endangering the lives of its own troops. The recent arrest of three Army intelligence officers and seven policemen suspected of spying for the insurgents is unsettling.

The effort by the Army to win the hearts and minds of the people also is not working. Obviously, an Army that is incapable of protecting its own men does not inspire confidence among ordinary people under fire. Locals naturally refuse to cooperate with the authorities for fear of reprisal by ruthless militants.

It is only fair to ask what has the Army learned, if anything, in the past four years? How has it adjusted its tactics and strategies? Porous land and sea borders with Malaysia continue to be largely unguarded - why? Who among the military's top brass will provide the leadership to reform the Army, Navy and Air Force?

How long can this series of military blunders go on before the armed forces loses the will to fight altogether?

It may be true that a lasting peace in the deep South can be achieved through political settlement, through peace talks at the negotiation table. But it cannot be emphasised enough that an effective military - with the will, knowledge and ability to fight insurgents - must go hand in hand with any political initiative.

As a democratic country, Thailand must not be forced to negotiate with hate-filled insurgents, certainly not under fire, and not when innocent civilians continue to be terrorised and victimised. The military has much to learn from Thailand's previous successes in suppressing communist insurgents in the mid-1980s and the previous generation of Malay separatists in the early 1990s. And - if peace is to be restored in the troubled region - it must adopt and adapt much more quickly.

The Nation

you are really into army stuff. damn, i miss that siri guy.

[VAMAN]

you are really into army stuff. damn, i miss that siri guy.

Oh yes I am, and also current affairs. We should be aware of the happenings around the world. Thanks to siri he also started Indian army thread.

[Aardvark]

EDITORIAL
The military must adapt

There is much to learn from previous counter-insurgent successes against communists and Malay separatists

Published on January 18, 2008

It doesn't take an expert to tell that the Thai military is in need of a drastic overhaul, something that it has consistently failed to do over the years. The armed forces personnel remain high at about 300,000 almost two decades after the end of the Cold War and victories over the communist insurgency in the late 1980s and the previous generation of armed separatists in the South. Instead of reforming and transforming into a leaner, more effective professional fighting force capable of meeting changing national security requirements, the military has deteriorated into a bloated bureaucracy. Troops are poorly trained and are commanded by desk-bound officers with little or no combat experience. Hundreds of generals have no clear job descriptions.

Last year, an exasperated former Army chief, Gen Sonthi Boonyaratglin, lamented the military's low morale and poor performance as reflected in the worsening situation in the deep South. It was brave of Sonthi to own up to the Army's mistakes and shortcomings. But whether such criticism has led to any effort among the rank and file to right the wrongs, to improve the Army's battle-readiness, remains very much in doubt.

Four years after the beginning of the insurgency by Islamic militants/Malay separatists in the deep South, it is impossible to ignore the failure of the Army to achieve its objectives: to suppress the insurgency, protect the civilian population and restore peace or at least a semblance of law and order in the strife-torn region.

The insurgents are still able to carry out their campaign to terrorise local people through random murders, planting bombs at busy public places, ambushing military convoys, and inflicting heavy casualties on soldiers who have received inadequate training in counter-insurgency tactics.

Even after four years of the struggle against the insurgents, the Army still has not set up rapid deployment forces that can be dispatched to provide reinforcements, rescue wounded soldiers and pursue insurgents.

Soldiers under attack are left to their own devices and the wounded are almost always not rescued in time. Often they are finished off execution-style and they are mutilated or decapitated. Under such circumstances, it is understandable that the tens of thousands of troops in the deep South suffer from low morale.

Employing hit-and-run tactics, insurgents can always hide among the civilian population, plotting more attacks. At the same time, the Army not only lacks good intelligence but also has serious difficulty in keeping its operational plans secret, thus endangering the lives of its own troops. The recent arrest of three Army intelligence officers and seven policemen suspected of spying for the insurgents is unsettling.

The effort by the Army to win the hearts and minds of the people also is not working. Obviously, an Army that is incapable of protecting its own men does not inspire confidence among ordinary people under fire. Locals naturally refuse to cooperate with the authorities for fear of reprisal by ruthless militants.

It is only fair to ask what has the Army learned, if anything, in the past four years? How has it adjusted its tactics and strategies? Porous land and sea borders with Malaysia continue to be largely unguarded - why? Who among the military's top brass will provide the leadership to reform the Army, Navy and Air Force?

How long can this series of military blunders go on before the armed forces loses the will to fight altogether?

It may be true that a lasting peace in the deep South can be achieved through political settlement, through peace talks at the negotiation table. But it cannot be emphasised enough that an effective military - with the will, knowledge and ability to fight insurgents - must go hand in hand with any political initiative.

As a democratic country, Thailand must not be forced to negotiate with hate-filled insurgents, certainly not under fire, and not when innocent civilians continue to be terrorised and victimised. The military has much to learn from Thailand's previous successes in suppressing communist insurgents in the mid-1980s and the previous generation of Malay separatists in the early 1990s. And - if peace is to be restored in the troubled region - it must adopt and adapt much more quickly.

The Nation

We need some good ledership

[BPD1586]

We need some good ledership

Can half Thais join the Thai Army?

[VAMAN]

Beijing Olympics 2008

(IMG:http://img372.imageshack.us/img372/5729/2880532indexleadthumbbkow7.jpg)
Lieutenant Somjit Jongcohor of Royal Thai Army. The gold medal winner of flyweight 51 kg division boxing in Beijing 2008. As a reward, he will be promoted to Captian when he come back to Thailand.

(IMG:http://i175.photobucket.com/albums/w133/thaivisa2/Thaksin/y338.jpg)
Prapawadee Jaroenrattanatarakul, the gold medal winner of women's 53kg weightlifting in Beijing 2008. She will apply for the job in Royal Thai Army after the game and RTA is looking to accept her request.

This post has been edited by VAMAN: Sep 11 2008, 12:55 AM

[AEROFORCE1]

EDITORIAL
The military must adapt

There is much to learn from previous counter-insurgent successes against communists and Malay separatists

Published on January 18, 2008

It doesn't take an expert to tell that the Thai military is in need of a drastic overhaul, something that it has consistently failed to do over the years. The armed forces personnel remain high at about 300,000 almost two decades after the end of the Cold War and victories over the communist insurgency in the late 1980s and the previous generation of armed separatists in the South. Instead of reforming and transforming into a leaner, more effective professional fighting force capable of meeting changing national security requirements, the military has deteriorated into a bloated bureaucracy. Troops are poorly trained and are commanded by desk-bound officers with little or no combat experience. Hundreds of generals have no clear job descriptions.

Last year, an exasperated former Army chief, Gen Sonthi Boonyaratglin, lamented the military's low morale and poor performance as reflected in the worsening situation in the deep South. It was brave of Sonthi to own up to the Army's mistakes and shortcomings. But whether such criticism has led to any effort among the rank and file to right the wrongs, to improve the Army's battle-readiness, remains very much in doubt.

Four years after the beginning of the insurgency by Islamic militants/Malay separatists in the deep South, it is impossible to ignore the failure of the Army to achieve its objectives: to suppress the insurgency, protect the civilian population and restore peace or at least a semblance of law and order in the strife-torn region.

The insurgents are still able to carry out their campaign to terrorise local people through random murders, planting bombs at busy public places, ambushing military convoys, and inflicting heavy casualties on soldiers who have received inadequate training in counter-insurgency tactics.

Even after four years of the struggle against the insurgents, the Army still has not set up rapid deployment forces that can be dispatched to provide reinforcements, rescue wounded soldiers and pursue insurgents.

Soldiers under attack are left to their own devices and the wounded are almost always not rescued in time. Often they are finished off execution-style and they are mutilated or decapitated. Under such circumstances, it is understandable that the tens of thousands of troops in the deep South suffer from low morale.

Employing hit-and-run tactics, insurgents can always hide among the civilian population, plotting more attacks. At the same time, the Army not only lacks good intelligence but also has serious difficulty in keeping its operational plans secret, thus endangering the lives of its own troops. The recent arrest of three Army intelligence officers and seven policemen suspected of spying for the insurgents is unsettling.

The effort by the Army to win the hearts and minds of the people also is not working. Obviously, an Army that is incapable of protecting its own men does not inspire confidence among ordinary people under fire. Locals naturally refuse to cooperate with the authorities for fear of reprisal by ruthless militants.

It is only fair to ask what has the Army learned, if anything, in the past four years? How has it adjusted its tactics and strategies? Porous land and sea borders with Malaysia continue to be largely unguarded - why? Who among the military's top brass will provide the leadership to reform the Army, Navy and Air Force?

How long can this series of military blunders go on before the armed forces loses the will to fight altogether?

It may be true that a lasting peace in the deep South can be achieved through political settlement, through peace talks at the negotiation table. But it cannot be emphasised enough that an effective military - with the will, knowledge and ability to fight insurgents - must go hand in hand with any political initiative.

As a democratic country, Thailand must not be forced to negotiate with hate-filled insurgents, certainly not under fire, and not when innocent civilians continue to be terrorised and victimised. The military has much to learn from Thailand's previous successes in suppressing communist insurgents in the mid-1980s and the previous generation of Malay separatists in the early 1990s. And - if peace is to be restored in the troubled region - it must adopt and adapt much more quickly.

The Nation

We still need better equipment like a better tank for our army at south ,just for the sake of safe their life

[VAMAN]

(IMG:http://i34.tinypic.com/2m469uu.jpg)

(IMG:http://i38.tinypic.com/1zcms8h.jpg)
A Thai soldier stands guard near the Cekakiri Svarak pagoda of the Preah Vihear temple, about 245 km (152 miles) north of Phnom Penh, July 25, 2008

[VAMAN]

Approval for guns, vessel, Klong Dan

PRADIT RUANGDIT

UDON THANI : The cabinet yesterday approved a 6.2-billion-baht budget for the army and navy to buy weapons and other equipment under a plan to modernise the defence forces.

All deals will be made through government-to-government contracts, government spokesman Pol Lt-Gen Wichienchote Sukchoterat said.

The army received permission to purchase 531 Negev rifles made in Israel at a cost of 140 million baht and to sign a long-term financial commitment to buy 15,037 Tavor rifles, also from Israel, for another one billion baht. The Tavor deal is over three years, from now until 2010.

The army emphasised the firearms were needed to replace weapons which were in poor condition, the spokesman said.

The cabinet also approved an agreement with Russia to purchase portable air-defence systems at a cost of 132 million baht and a long-term financial commitment for five years to buy a landing craft for five billion baht.

Pol Lt-Gen Wichienchote said the cabinet also approved the completion of the Klong Dan water treatment project in Samut Prakan, which has been been on hold for over a decade because of corruption cases.

Since 92% of the construction had already been completed, the cabinet agreed it was better to finish the project, he said.

Source - http://www.bangkokpost.com/100908_News/10Sep2008_news13.php

This post has been edited by VAMAN: Sep 11 2008, 12:48 AM

[VAMAN]

Funding approved for weapons, new Parliament

By The Nation, Agencies
Published on September 10, 2008

Udon Thani - The Cabinet yesterday approved large amounts of funds to build a new Parliament house complex and to buy military weapons, government spokesmen said.

The decision came a few hours before the Constitution Court read its verdict disqualifying Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej for his involvement as an employee in two television cooking shows.

At its mobile meeting in the Northeastern province, the Cabinet endorsed a request by the House of Representatives' Secretariat for Bt774 million to build the new parliamentary compound at Bangkok's Kiak Kai area, said Deputy Government Spokesman Nattawut Saikua.

"The prime minister told the Cabinet meeting that the construction project for the new Parliament will continue, and the Kiak Kai area has been considered the most suitable for the project," he said.

The Government House compound has not been used since anti-government protesters began occupying the grounds two weeks ago.

The Cabinet yesterday also approved the purchase of military weapons worth more than Bt6 billion, Government Spokesman Wichianchot Sukchotrat told reporters.

The deal includes a Bt4.9-billion amphibious frigate, a small aircraft, a laser mapping system and thousands of rifles and other light weapons.

"It's related to the Defence Ministry and internal security," the spokesman said.

The announcement was made before the court ordered Samak, who was also the defence minister, to resign for accepting payments for hosting television cooking shows but that was not expected to have an impact on the arms purchase.

The government approved the purchase of thousands of rifles and other light arms from Israel, as well as shoulder-fired missiles from Russia, the spokesman said.

The frigate will be built in Thailand, he said.

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2008/09/10/politics/politics_30083054.php

[odsca]

oh $hit.... we are indeed been left behind...
the Armed Forces of the Philippines must
push thru its modernization project ASAP...
we got only a number scorpion tank
and a lot of APCs(SIMBAS).....
if war will break out between philippines and thailand then we will surely be crushed... (IMG:style_emoticons/default/bawling.gif)

100k+ AFP with vietnam era weapons vs. 200K+ thai army...

thats a mismatch!!! (IMG:style_emoticons/default/embarassedlaugh.gif)

We will never go to war with you great people (IMG:style_emoticons/default/biggrin.gif)

[tos]

We need some good ledership

Yes , as long as you are a thai citizen.
Enlisting is a option , as most thai men will be of national service age at 21 years, but if you want to bee a officer in the Military you pretty much need to decide your future carrer path when your in high school. (IMG:style_emoticons/default/beerchug.gif)

[Mozikillah]

^
IF enlisted with a diploma, what rank do you get from the start?!
I am 19 years old and a 2nd year ABAC student..
I really am intrested in getting into the Royal Thai Marines but have no idea upon how to get into it!