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Sukarno, Suharto, PKI, CIA and the 1965 massacre
theaccidentaltou...
post Jan 6 2006, 11:10 AM
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The Indonesian Massacres and the CIA
by Ralph McGehee
Covert Action Quarterly, Fall 1990


In my original article ( The Nation, April 11, 1981) I tried to explain, through the
constraints of the secrecy agreement and the deletions by the CIA's review board,
one aspect of the Agency's successful effort to manipulate events in Indonesia in
late 1965 and early 1966. The article was based on a classified CIA study of which
I was custodian while working in the International Communism Branch of the CIA's
Counterintelligence Staff. The Nation joined with me in an unsuccessful lawsuit by
the ACLU to gain release of the deleted portions of the article. The Agency claims
it cannot delete unclassified lies or speculations. By heavily censoring my article,
it effectively admitted to an Agency role in the operation.

In a recent story in the San Francisco Examiner, researcher Kathy Kadane quotes
CIA and State department officials who admit compiling lists of names of the
Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), making those lists available to the Indonesian
military, and checking names off as people were "eliminated.'' The killings were
part of a massive bloodletting after an abortive coup attempt taking, according to
various estimates, between 250,000 and 1,000,000 lives and ultimately led to the
overthrow of President Sukarno's government.

Since then a debate has simmered over what happened. A recent study based on
information from former Johnson ad ministration officials, asserted that for months
the U.S. "did their damnedest" through public pressure and more discreet methods,
to prod the Indonesian army to move against Sukarno without success.

Debate continues over the origins of the coup attempt called Gestapu. Was it the
result of CIA machinations, a takeover maneuver by General Suharto, a revolt by
leftist officers under the control of the PKI, a power play by the People's Republic
of China, a pre-emptive strike by Sukarno loyalists to prevent a move by officers
friendly to the CIA, some combination of these factors, or others as yet unknown?
I confess to no inside knowledge of the Gestapu.

Historical Background
It is well known that the CIA had long sought to unseat Sukarno: by funding an
opposition political party in the mid-1950s, sponsoring a massive military overthrow
attempt in the mid-1958, planning his assassination in 1961, and by rigging
intelligence to inflame official U.S. concerns in order to win approval for planned
covert actions.

Before attempting to describe one aspect of the CIA's role, it is essential to provide
background on the scope and nature of its worldwide operations. Between 1961 and
1975 the Agency conducted 900 major or sensitive operations, and thousands of
lesser covert actions. The majority of its operations were propaganda, election or
paramilitary. Countries of major concern, such as Indonesia in the early 1960s,
were usually subjected to the CIA's most concerted attention.

Critics of the CIA have aptly described the mainstays of such attention: "discrediting
political groups... by forged documents that may be attributed to them. . . ," faking
"communist weapon shipments,'' capturing communist documents and then inserting
forgeries prepared by the Agency's Technical Services Division. The CIA's "Mighty
Wurlitzer" then emblazoned and disseminated the details of such "discoveries."

The Mighty Wurlitzer was a worldwide propaganda mechanism consisting of
hundreds or even thousands of media representatives and officials including, over
a period of years, approximately 400 members of the American media. The CIA
has used the Wurlitzer and its successors to plant stories and to suppress expository
or critical reporting in order to manipulate domestic and international perceptions.

From the early 1980s, many media operations formerly the responsibility of the CIA
have been funded somewhat overtly by the National Endowment for Democracy
(NED). From the earliest days, the Agency's International Organizations Division
(IOD) implemented and coordinated its extensive covert operations. The division's
activities created or assisted international organizations for youth, students,
teachers, workers, veterans, journalists, and jurists. The CIA used, and continues
to use, the various labor, student, and other suborned organizations not only for
intelligence and propaganda purposes, but also to participate in elections and
paramilitary operations and to assist in overthrowing governments. At the same
time, the CIA manipulates their organizational publications for covert propaganda
goals.

The labor unions the CIA creates and subsidizes, in their more virulent stages,
provide strong-arm goon squads who burn buildings, threaten and beat up
opponents, pose as groups of the opposition to discredit them, terrorize and
control labor meetings, and participate in coups.


Use of "Subversive Control Watch Lists"
As a matter of course, the Agency develops close relationships with security
services in friendly nations and exploits these in many ways-by recruiting
unilateral sources to spy on the home government, by implementing pro-U.S.
policies, and by gathering and exchanging intelligence. As one aspect of those
liaisons, the CIA universally compiles local "Subversive Control Watch Lists" of
leftists for attention by the local government. Frequently that attention is the
charter of government death squads.

After the CIA's overthrow of Arbenz's government in Guatemala in 1954, the U.S.
gave the new government lists of opponents to be eliminated. In Chile from 1971
through 1973, the CIA fomented a military coup through forgery and propaganda
operations and compiled arrest lists of thousands, many of whom were later
arrested and assassinated. In Bolivia in 1975, the CIA provided lists of progressive
priests and nuns to the government which planned to harass, arrest and expel
them. To curry the favor of Khomeini, in 1983 the CIA gave his government a
list of KGB agents and collaborators operating in Iran. Khomeini then executed
200 suspects and closed down the communist Tudeh party. In Thailand, I
provided the names of hundreds of leftists to Thai security services.

The Phoenix program in Vietnam was a massive U.S.-backed program to
compile arrest and assassination lists of the Viet Cong for action by CIA-created
Provisional Reconnaissance Unit death squads. In fact, former Director of the CIA
William Colby compared the Indonesian operation directly to the Vietnam Phoenix
Program. Colby further admitted directing the CIA to concentrate on compiling lists
of members of the PKI and other left groups.

In 1963, responding to Colby's direction, U.S.-trained Indonesian trade unionists
began gathering the names of workers who were members or sympathizers of
unions affiliated with the national labor federation, SOBSI. These trade unionist
spies laid the groundwork for many of the massacres of 1965-1966. The CIA also
used elements in the 105,000 strong Indonesian national police force to penetrate
and gather information on the PKI.

Providing "Watch Lists" based on technical and human penetration of targeted
groups is a continuing program of CIA covert operators. Today, U.S.-advised
security services in El Salvador, using the techniques of the Phoenix program,
operate throughout El Salvador and have taken a heavy toll on peasants, activists
and labor leaders in that country. In the late 1980s, the CIA began assisting the
Philippine government in the conduct of "low-intensity" operations by, among other
things, computerizing security service records of leftists and assisting in the
development of a national identity card program. Wherever the CIA cooperates with
other national security services it is safe to assume that it also compiles and passes
"Subversive Control Watch Lists."

Putting the Pieces Together

All of this is essential to understanding what happened in Indonesia in 1965 and
1966. In September and October of 1965, the murder of six top military officers
during the Gestapu coup attempt provided a pretext for destroying the PKI and
removing Sukarno. Surviving officers-principally General Suharto, who was not
a target-rallied the army and defeated the coup, ultimately unseating Sukarno.

Two weeks before the coup, the army had been warned that the PKI was plotting to
assassinate army leaders. The PKI, nominally backed by Sukarno, was a legal and
formidable organization and was the third largest Communist Party in the world. It
claimed three million members, and through affiliated organizations-such as labor
and youth groups-it had the support of 17 million others. The Army's anxiety had
been fed by rumors throughout 1965 that mainland China was smuggling arms to
the PKI for an imminent revolt. Such a story appeared in a Malaysian newspaper,
citing Bangkok sources which relied in turn on Hong Kong sources. Such
untraceability is a telltale mark of the Mighty Wurlitzer.

Less subtle propaganda claimed that the PKI was a tool of the Red Chinese and
planned to infiltrate and divide the armed forces. To bolster these allegations,
"communist weapons" were discovered inside Chinese crates labeled as
construction material. Far more inflammatory news reporting prior to October
1965 claimed the PKI had a secret list of civilian and military leaders marked for
beheading.

After the coup attempt the Indonesian Army in the main left the PKI alone, as
there was no credible evidence to substantiate the horror stories in the press.
[Eight sentences censored.] As noted, a favorite tactic is to arrange for the
capture of communist documents and then insert forgeries prepared by the
Agency's Technical Services Division.
Suddenly documents were serendipitously discovered providing "proof" of PKI
guilt. On October 23, 1965, the Suara Islam reported:
...millions of copies of the text of a proclamation of the counterrevolutionary
Gestapu...have been recovered.... The text...was obviously printed in the CPR
[People's Republic of China]. Steel helmets and a large quantity of military
equipment have also been found.... There is in controvertible evidence of the CPR's
involvement.... The arms sent by the CPR were shipped under cover of "diplomatic
immunity." ...other important documents offer irrefutable evidence of the
involvement of the CPR Embassy and the CPR ambassador....

On October 30,1965 Major General Suharto, in a speech before a military audience,
angrily denounced the PKI saying that captured documents proved the PKI was
behind Gestapu. Suharto demanded that the "Communists be completely uprooted."
On November 2, the Indonesian Armed Forces Bulletin asserted that the PKI had a
plan for revolution, and published supposed PKI directives for the period following
the October coup attempt. The document stated that the PKI "is only supporting the
revolutionary council" that the coup tried to establish. It added that if the council
were crushed the PKI would "directly confront" the generals whom the coup leaders
accused of planning to overthrow President Sukarno. The document also said,
"when the revolution is directly led by the PKI, we can achieve victory because
the command will be under the PKI-our hidden strength is in the armed forces."

Military leaders [seven words censored] began a bloody extermination campaign.
Civilians involved were either recruited and trained by the army on the spot, or
were drawn from groups such as the army- and CIA-sponsored SOKSI trade
unions [Central Organization of Indonesian Socialist Employees], and allied
student organizations. Media fabrications had played a key role in preparing
public opinion and mobilizing these groups for the massacre.

The documents, manufactured stories of communist plans and atrocities, and
claims of communist arms shipments created an atmosphere of hysteria, resulting
in the slaughter and the establishment of a dictatorship that still exists today.

The Agency wrote a secret study of what it did in Indonesia. [One sentence
censored.] The CIA was extremely proud of its [one word censored] and
recommended it as a model for future operations [one half sentence censored].

Yesterday's Fake News, Today's Fake History
The CIA desperately wants to conceal evidence of its role in the massacre, which it
admits was one of the century's worst. The U.S. media seem equally determined to
protect the American image from consequences of covert operations.

Reaction to Kadane's new revelations was swift. An Op-Ed by columnist Stephen S.
Rosenfeld in the July 20, 1990 Washington Post, and an article by correspondent
Michael Wines in the July 12, 1990 New York Times, each deny any CIA role in the
massacre. Rosenfeld, reversing his conclusions of a week before, ignores the new
evidence, cites one of many academic studies, and concludes with certainty: "For
me, the question of the American role in Indonesia is closed."

Prior to his article, Wines interviewed me. His approach was to reject any
information that might implicate the Agency. I told him virtually everything in this
article and more. He dismissed the information and instead quoted John Hughes,
an "observer removed from the controversy," citing him as formerly of the
Christian Science Monitor but failing to mention that he was also State Department
spokesman from 1982 to 1985. In an interview with Kadane, Hughes claimed that
during the coup which brought Suharto to power, he functioned as the "eyes
and ears of the embassy." Wines was uninterested.

Subversive control watch lists are an effective and deadly political tool long used by
U.S. intelligence, so deadly that the Agency cannot allow them to become public
knowledge. Keeping them secret depends on at least two things: Agency
censorship of government employees, and self-censorship by the mainstream
media.

Ralph McGehee worked for the CIA from 1952 until 1977 and now writes about
intelligence matters, notably the book Deadly Deceits -- My 25 years in the CIA
(New York: Sheridan Square Press, 1983). He has compiled a computer data base
on CIA activities. Persons interested may write to him at: 422 Arkansas Ave., Herndon, VA 22070.


direct link: thirdworldtraveler.com/CIA/McGehee_CIA_Indo.html

This post has been edited by theaccidentaltourist: Jan 7 2006, 03:10 AM
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theaccidentaltou...
post Jan 6 2006, 11:33 AM
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The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967
Peter Dale Scott

In this short paper on a huge and vexed subject, I discuss the U.S. involvement in
the bloody overthrow of Indonesia's President Sukarno, 1965-67. The whole story
of that ill-understood period would transcend even the fullest possible written
analysis. Much of what happened can never be documented; and of the
documentation that survives, much is both controversial and unverifiable.
The slaughter of Sukarno's left-wing allies was a product of widespread paranoia
as well as of conspiratorial policy, and represents a tragedy beyond the intentions
of any single group or coalition. Nor is it suggested that in 1965 the only
provocations and violence came from the right-wing Indonesian military,
their contacts in the United States, or (also important, but barely touched on
here) their mutual contacts in British, German and Japanese intelligence.

And yet, after all this has been said, the complex and ambiguous story of the
Indonesian bloodbath is also in essence simpler and easier to believe than the
public version inspired by President Suharto and U.S. government sources. Their
problematic claim is that in the so-called Gestapu (Gerakan September
Tigapuluh) coup attempt of September 30, 1965 (when six senior army generals
were murdered), the left attacked the right, leading to a restoration of power, and
punitive purge of the left, by the center.1 This article argues instead that, by
inducing, or at a minimum helping to induce, the Gestapu "coup," the right in the
Indonesian Army eliminated its rivals at the army's center, thus paving the way to
a long-planned elimination of the civilian left, and eventually to the establishment
of a military dictatorship.2 Gestapu, in other words, was only the first phase of a
three-phase right-wing coup -- one which had been both publicly encouraged and
secretly assisted by U.S. spokesmen and officials.3

Before turning to U.S. involvement in what the CIA itself has called "one of the worst
mass murders of the twentieth century,"4 let us recall what actually led up to it.
According to the Australian scholar Harold Crouch, by 1965 the Indonesian Army
General Staff was split into two camps. At the center were the general staff officers
appointed with, and loyal to, the army commander General Yani, who in turn was
reluctant to challenge President Sukarno's policy of national unity in alliance with
the Indonesian Communist party, or PKI. The second group, including the right-wing
generals Nasution and Suharto, comprised those opposed to Yani and his Sukarnoist
policies.5 All of these generals were anti-PKI, but by 1965 the divisive issue was
Sukarno.

The simple (yet untold) story of Sukarno's overthrow is that in the fall of 1965 Yani
and his inner circle of generals were murdered, paving the way for a seizure of
power by right-wing anti-Yani forces allied to Suharto. The key to this was the
so-called Gestapu coup attempt which, in the name of supporting Sukarno, in fact
targeted very precisely the leading members of the army's most loyal faction, the
Yani group.6 An army unity meeting in January 1965, between "Yani's inner circle"
and those (including Suharto) who "had grievances of one sort or another against
Yani," lined up the victims of September 30 against those who came to power after
their murder.7

Not one anti-Sukarno general was targeted by Gestapu, with the obvious exception
of General Nasution.8 But by 1961 the CIA operatives had become disillusioned with
Nasution as a reliable asset, because of his "consistent record of yielding to
Sukarno on several major counts."9 Relations between Suharto and Nasution
were also cool, since Nasution, after investigating Suharto on corruption charges
in 1959, had transferred him from his command.10

The duplicitous distortions of reality, first by Lt. Colonel Untung's statements for
Gestapu, and then by Suharto in "putting down" Gestapu, are mutually supporting
lies.11 Untung, on October 1, announced ambiguously that Sukarno was under
Gestapu's "protection" (he was not); also, that a CIA-backed Council of Generals
had planned a coup for before October 5, and had for this purpose brought "troops
from East, Central, and West Java" to Jakarta.12 Troops from these areas had
indeed been brought to Jakarta for an Armed Forces Day parade on October 5th.
Untung did not mention, however, that "he himself had been involved in the planning
for the Armed Forces Day parade and in selecting the units to participate in it;"13
nor that these units (which included his own former battalion, the 454th) supplied
most of the allies for his new battalion's Gestapu activities in Jakarta.


Suharto's first two broadcasts reaffirmed the army's constant loyalty to "Bung Karno
the Great Leader," and also blamed the deaths of six generals on PKI youth and
women, plus "elements of the Air Force" -- on no other evidence than the site of the
well where the corpses were found.14 At this time he knew very well that the
killings had in fact been carried out by the very army elements Untung referred to,
elements under Suharto's own command.15

Thus, whatever the motivation of individuals such as Untung in the Gestapu putsch,
Gestapu as such was duplicitous. Both its rhetoric and above all its actions were not
simply inept; they were carefully designed to prepare for Suharto's equally
duplicitous response. For example, Gestapu's decision to guard all sides of the
downtown Merdeka Square in Jakarta, except that on which Suharto's KOSTRAD
[Army Strategic Reserve Command] headquarters were situated, is consistent with
Gestapu's decision to target the only army generals who might have challenged
Suharto's assumption of power. Again, Gestapu's announced transfer of power to a
totally fictitious "Revolutionary Council," from which Sukarno had been excluded,
allowed Suharto in turn to masquerade as Sukarno's defender while in fact
preventing him from resuming control. More importantly, Gestapu's gratuitous
murder of the generals near the air force base where PKI youth had been trained
allowed Suharto, in a Goebbels-like manoeuvre, to transfer the blame for the
killings from the troops under his own command (whom he knew had carried out
the kidnappings) to air force and PKI personnel who where ignorant of them.16

From the pro-Suharto sources -- notably the CIA study of Gestapu published in 1968
-- we learn how few troops were involved in the alleged Gestapu rebellion, and,
more importantly, that in Jakarta as in Central Java the same battalions that
supplied the "rebellious" companies were also used to "put the rebellion down." Two
thirds of one paratroop brigade (which Suharto had inspected the previous day)
plus one company and one platoon constituted the whole of Gestapu forces in
Jakarta; all but one of these units were commanded by present or former
Diponegoro Division officers close to Suharto; and the last was under an officer
who obeyed Suharto's close political ally, Basuki Rachmat.17

Two of these companies, from the 454th and 530th battalions, were elite raiders,
and from 1962 these units had been among the main Indonesian recipients of U.S.
assistance.18 This fact, which in itself proves nothing, increases our curiosity about
the many Gestapu leaders who had been U.S.-trained. The Gestapu leader in
Central Java, Saherman, had returned from training at Fort Leavenworth and
Okinawa, shortly before meeting with Untung and Major Sukirno of the 454th
Battalion in mid-August 1965.19 As Ruth McVey has observed, Saherman's
acceptance for training at Fort Leavenworth "would mean that he had passed
review by CIA observers."20

Thus there is continuity between the achievements of both Gestapu and the response
to it by Suharto, who in the name of defending Sukarno and attacking Gestapu
continued its task of eliminating the pro-Yani members of the Army General Staff,
along with such other residual elements of support for first Yani and then Sukarno
as remained.21

The biggest part of this task was of course the elimination of the PKI and its
supporters, in a bloodbath which, as some Suharto allies now concede, may have
taken more than a half-million lives. These three events -- Gestapu, Suharto's
response, and the bloodbath -- have nearly always been presented in this country
as separately motivated: Gestapu being described as a plot by leftists, and the
bloodbath as for the most part an irrational act of popular frenzy.

U.S. officials, journalists and scholars, some with rather prominent CIA connections,
are perhaps principally responsible for the myth that the bloodbath was a
spontaneous, popular revulsion to what U.S. Ambassador Jones later called PKI
"carnage."22 Although the PKI certainly contributed its share to the political hysteria
of 1965, Crouch has shown that subsequent claims of a PKI terror campaign were
grossly exaggerated.23 In fact systematic killing occurred under army instigation in
staggered stages, the worst occurring as Colonel Sarwo Edhie's RPKAD [Army
Paracommando Regiment] moved from Jakarta to Central and East Java, and finally
to Bali.24 Civilians involved in the massacre were either recruited and trained by
the army on the spot, or were drawn from groups (such as the army- and
CIA-sponsored SOKSI trade unions [Central Organization of Indonesian Socialist
Employees], and allied student organizations) which had collaborated for years
with the army on political matters. It is clear from Sundhaussen's account that in
most of the first areas of organized massacre (North Sumatra, Aceh, Cirebon, the
whole of Central and East Java), there were local army commanders with especially
strong and proven anti-PKI sentiments. Many of these had for years cooperated
with civilians, through so-called "civic action" programs sponsored by the United
States, in operations directed against the PKI and sometimes Sukarno. Thus one
can legitimately suspect conspiracy in the fact that anti-PKI "civilian responses"
began on October 1, when the army began handing out arms to Muslim students
and unionists, before there was any publicly available evidence linking Gestapu to
the PKI.25

Even Sundhaussen, who downplays the army's role in arming and inciting the
civilian murder bands, concludes that, whatever the strength of popular anti-PKI
hatred and fear, "without the Army's anti-PKI propaganda the massacre might
not have happened."26 The present article goes further and argues that Gestapu,
Suharto's response, and the bloodbath were part of a single coherent scenario for
a military takeover, a scenario which was again followed closely in Chile in the
years 1970-73 (and to some extent in Cambodia in 1970).

Suharto, of course, would be a principal conspirator in this scenario: his duplicitous
role of posing as a defender of the constitutional status quo, while in fact moving
deliberately to overthrow it, is analogous to that of General Pinochet in Chile. But
a more direct role in organizing the bloodbath was played by civilians and officers
close to the cadres of the CIA's failed rebellion of 1958, now working in so-called
"civic action" programs funded and trained by the United States. Necessary
ingredients of the scenario had to be, and clearly were, supplied by other nations
in support of Suharto. Many such countries appear to have played such a supporting
role: Japan, Britain, Germany,27 possibly Australia. But I wish to focus on the
encouragement and support for military "putschism" and mass murder which
came from the U.S., from the CIA, the military, RAND, the Ford Foundation, and
individuals.28

The United States and the Indonesian Army's "Mission"
It seems clear that from as early as 1953 the U.S. was interested in helping to
foment the regional crisis in Indonesia, usually recognized as the "immediate cause"
that induced Sukarno, on March 14, 1957, to proclaim martial law, and bring "the
officer corps legitimately into politics."29

By 1953 (if not earlier) the U.S. National Security Council had already adopted one
of a series of policy documents calling for "appropriate action, in collaboration with
other friendly countries, to prevent permanent communist control" of Indonesia.30
Already NSC 171/1 of that year envisaged military training as a means of
increasing U.S. influence, even though the CIA's primary efforts were directed
towards right-wing political parties ("moderates ... on the right," as NSC 171 called
them): notably the Masjumi Muslim and the PSI "Socialist" parties. The millions of
dollars which the CIA poured into the Masjumi and the PSI in the mid-1950s were a
factor influencing the events of 1965, when a former PSI member -- Sjam -- was
the alleged mastermind of Gestapu,31 and PSI-leaning officers -- notably Suwarto
and Sarwo Edhie -- were prominent in planning and carrying out the anti-PKI
response to Gestapu.32

In 1957-58, the CIA infiltrated arms and personnel in support of the regional
rebellions against Sukarno. These operations were nominally covert, even though
an American plane and pilot were captured, and the CIA efforts were accompanied
by an offshore task force of the U.S. Seventh Fleet.33 In 1975 a Senate Select
Committee studying the CIA discovered what it called "some evidence of CIA
involvement in plans to assassinate President Sukarno"; but, after an initial
investigation of the November 1957 assassination attempt in the Cikini district
of Jakarta, the committee did not pursue the matter.34

On August 1, 1958, after the failure of the CIA-sponsored PRRI-Permesta regional
rebellions against Sukarno, the U.S. began an upgraded military assistance program
to Indonesia in the order of twenty million dollars a year.35 A U.S. Joint Chiefs of
Staff memo of 1958 makes it clear this aid was given to the Indonesian Army ("the
only non-Communist force ... with the capability of obstructing the ... PKI") as
"encouragement" to Nasution to "carry out his 'plan' for the control of
Communism."36

The JCS had no need to spell out Nasution's "plan," to which other documents at this
time made reference.37 It could only imply the tactics for which Nasution had
distinguished himself (in American eyes) during the crushing of the PKI in the Madiun
Affair of 1948: mass murders and mass arrests, at a minimum of the party's cadres,
possibly after an army provocation.38 Nasution confirmed this in November 1965,
after the Gestapu slaughter, when he called for the total extinction of the PKI,
"down to its very roots so there will be no third Madiun."39

By 1958, however, the PKI had emerged as the largest mass movement in the
country. It is in this period that a small group of U.S. academic researchers in U.S.
Air Force- and CIA-subsidized "think-tanks" began pressuring their contacts in the
Indonesian military publicly, often through U.S. scholarly journals and presses, to
seize power and liquidate the PKI opposition.40 The most prominent example is
Guy Pauker, who in 1958 both taught at the University of California at Berkeley
and served as a consultant at the RAND Corporation. In the latter capacity he
maintained frequent contact with what he himself called "a very small group" of
PSI intellectuals and their friends in the army.41

In a RAND Corporation book published by the Princeton University Press, Pauker
urged his contacts in the Indonesian military to assume "full responsibility" for
their nation's leadership, "fulfill a mission," and hence "to strike, sweep their
house clean."42 Although Pauker may not have intended anything like the scale of
bloodbath which eventually ensued, there is no escaping the fact that "mission"
and "sweep clean" were buzz-words for counterinsurgency and massacre, and as
such were used frequently before and during the coup. The first murder order, by
military officers to Muslim students in early october, was the word sikat, meaning
"sweep," "clean out," "wipe out," or "massacre."43

Pauker's closest friend in the Indonesian army was a U.S.-trained General Suwarto,
who played an important part in the conversion of the army from a revolutionary
to a counterinsurgency function. In the years after 1958, Suwarto built the
Indonesian Army Staff and Command School in Bandung (SESKOAD) into a
training-ground for the takeover of political power. SESKOAD in this period became
a focal-point of attention from the Pentagon, the CIA, RAND, and (indirectly) the
Ford Foundation.44

Under the guidance of Nasution and Suwarto, SESKOAD developed a new strategic
doctrine, that of Territorial Warfare (in a document translated into English by
Pauker), which gave priority to counterinsurgency as the army's role. Especially
after 1962, when the Kennedy administration aided the Indonesian Army in
developing Civic Mission or "civic action" programs, this meant the organization of
its own political infrastructure, or "Territorial Organization," reaching in some cases
down to the village level.45 As the result of an official U.S. State Department
recommendation in 1962, which Pauker helped write, a special U.S. MILTAG
(Military Training Advisory Group) was set up in Jakarta, to assist in the
implementation of SESKOAD's Civic Mission programs.46

SESKOAD also trained the army officers in economics and administration, and thus
to operate virtually as a para-state, independent of Sukarno's government. So the
army began to collaborate, and even sign contracts, with U.S. and other foreign
corporations in areas which were now under its control. This training program was
entrusted to officers and civilians close to the PSI.47 U.S. officials have confirmed
that the civilians, who themselves were in a training program funded by the Ford
Foundation, became involved in what the (then) U.S. military attache called
"contingency planning" to prevent a PKI takeover.48

But the most significant focus of U.S. training and aid was the Territorial
Organization's increasing liaison with "the civilian administration, religious and
cultural organizations, youth groups, veterans, trade unions, peasant organizations,
political parties and groups at regional and local levels."49 These political liaisons
with civilian groups provided the structure for the ruthless suppression of the PKI in
1965, including the bloodbath.50

Soon these army and civilian cadres were together plotting disruptive activities, such
as the Bandung anti-Chinese riots of May 1963, which embarrassed not just the
PKI, but Sukarno himself. Chomsky and Herman report that "Army-inspired
anti-Chinese programs that took place in West Java in 1959 were financed by
U.S. contributions to the local army commander"; apparently CIA funds were
used by the commander (Colonel Kosasih) to pay local thugs in what Mozingo calls
"the army's (and probably the Americans') campaign to rupture relations with
China."51 The 1963 riot, which took place in the very shadow of SESKOAD, is
linked by Sundhaussen to an army "civic action" organization; and shows
conspiratorial contact between elements (an underground PSI cell, PSI- and
Masjumi-affiliated student groups, and General Ishak Djuarsa of the Siliwangi
Division's "civic action" organization) that would all be prominent in the very first
phase of Suharto's so-called "response" to the Gestapu.52 The May 1963 student
riots were repeated in October 1965 and (especially in Bandung) January 1966, at
which time the liaison between students and the army was largely in the hands of
PSI-leaning officers like Sarwo Edhie and Kemal Idris.53 The CIA Plans Directorate
was sympathetic to the increasing deflection of a nominally anti-PKI operation into
one embarrassing Sukarno. This turn would have come as no surprise: Suwarto,
Kemal Idris and the PSI had been prominent in a near-coup (the so-called "Lubis
affair") in 1956.54

But increasingly Suwarto cultivated a new student, Colonel Suharto, who arrived at
SESKOAD in October 1959. According to Sundhaussen, a relatively pro-Suharto
scholar: "In the early 1960s Soeharto was involved in the formation of the Doctrine
of Territorial Warfare and the Army's policy on Civic Mission (that is, penetration of
army officers into all fields of government activities and responsibilities).55 Central
to the public image of Gestapu and Suharto's response is the much-publicized fact
that Suharto, unlike his sometime teacher Suwarto, and his long-time chief of staff
Achmad Wiranatakusuma, had never studied in the United States. But his
involvement in Civic Mission (or what Americans called "civic action") programs
located him along with PSI-leaning officers at the focal point of U.S. training activities
in Indonesia, in a program which was nakedly political.56

The refinement of Territorial Warfare and Civic Mission Doctrine into a new strategic
doctrine for army political intervention became by 1965 the ideological process
consolidating the army for political takeover. After Gestapu, when Suwarto was an
important political advisor to his former SESKOAD pupil Suharto, his strategic
doctrine was the justification for Suharto's announcement on August 15, 1966, in
fulfillment of Pauker's public and private urgings, that the army had to assume a
leading role in all fields.57

Hence the army unity meeting of January 1965, arranged after Suharto had
duplicitously urged Nasution to take "a more accommodating line"58 towards
Sukarno, was in fact a necessary step in the process whereby Suharto effectively
took over from his rivals Yani and Nasution. It led to the April 1965 seminar at
SESKOAD for a compromise army strategic doctrine, the Tri Ubaya Cakti, which
"reaffirmed the army's claim to an independent political role."59 On August 15,
1966, Suharto, speaking to the nation, justified his increasing prominence in terms
of the "Revolutionary Mission" of the Tri Ubaya Cakti doctrine. Two weeks later at
SESKOAD the doctrine was revised, at Suharto's instigation but in a setting
"carefully orchestrated by Brigadier Suwarto," to embody still more clearly
Pauker's emphasis on the army's "Civic Mission" or counterrevolutionary role.60
This "Civic Mission," so important to Suharto, was also the principal goal and
fruit of U.S. military aid to Indonesia.

By August 1964, moreover, Suharto had initiated political contacts with Malaysia,
and hence eventually with Japan, Britain, and the United States.61 Although the
initial purpose of these contacts may have been to head off war with Malaysia,
Sundhaussen suggests that Suharto's motive was his concern, buttressed in
mid-1964 by a KOSTRAD intelligence report, about PKI political advances.62
Mrazek links the peace feelers to the withdrawal of "some of the best army units"
back to Java in the summer of 1965.63 These movements, together with earlier
deployment of a politically insecure Diponegoro battalion in the other direction, can
also be seen as preparations for the seizure of power.64

In Nishihara's informed Japanese account, former PRRI / Permesta personnel with
intelligence connections in Japan were prominent in these negotiations, along with
Japanese officials.65 Nishihara also heard that an intimate ally of these personnel,
Jan Walandouw, who may have acted as a CIA contact for the 1958 rebellion, later
again "visited Washington and advocated Suharto as a leader."66 I am reliably
informed that Walandouw's visit to Washington on behalf of Suharto was made
some months before Gestapu.67

The U.S. Moves Against Sukarno
Many people in Washington, especially in the CIA Plans Directorate, had long desired
the "removal" of Sukarno as well as of the PKI.68 By 1961 key policy hard-liners,
notably Guy Pauker, had also turned against Nasution.69 Nevertheless, despite
last-minute memoranda from the outgoing Eisenhower administration which would
have opposed "whatever regime" in Indonesia was "increasingly friendly toward the
Sino-Soviet bloc," the Kennedy administration stepped up aid to both Sukarno and
the army.70

However, Lyndon Johnson's accession to the presidency was followed almost
immediately by a shift to a more anti-Sukarno policy. This is clear from Johnson's
decision in December 1963 to withhold economic aid which (according to
Ambassador Jones) Kennedy would have supplied "almost as a matter of routine."71
This refusal suggests that the U.S. aggravation of Indonesia's economic woes in
1963-65 was a matter of policy rather than inadvertence. Indeed, if the CIA's
overthrow of Allende is a relevant analogy, then one would expect someday to learn
that the CIA, through currency speculations and other hostile acts, contributed
actively to the radical destabilization of the Indonesian economy in the weeks just
before the coup, when "the price of rice quadrupled between June 30 and October 1,
and the black market price of the dollar skyrocketed, particularly in September."72

As was the case in Chile, the gradual cutoff of all economic aid to Indonesia in the
years 1962-65 was accompanied by a shift in military aid to friendly elements in the
Indonesian Army: U.S. military aid amounted to $39.5 million in the four years
1962-65 (with a peak of $16.3 million in 1962) as opposed to $28.3 million for the
thirteen years 1949-61.73 After March 1964, when Sukarno told the U.S., "go to hell
with your aid," it became increasingly difficult to extract any aid from the U.S.
congress: those persons not aware of what was developing found it hard to
understand why the U.S. should help arm a country which was nationalizing U.S.
economic interests, and using immense aid subsidies from the Soviet Union to
confront the British in Malaysia.

Thus a public image was created that under Johnson "all United States aid to
Indonesia was stopped," a claim so buttressed by misleading documentation that
competent scholars have repeated it.74 In fact, Congress had agreed to treat U.S.
funding of the Indonesian military (unlike aid to any other country) as a covert
matter, restricting congressional review of the president's determinations on
Indonesian aid to two Senate committees, and the House Speaker, who were
concurrently involved in oversight of the CIA.75

Ambassador Jones' more candid account admits that "suspension" meant "the U.S.
government undertook no new commitments of assistance, although it continued
with ongoing programs.... By maintaining our modest assistance to [the Indonesian
Army and the police brigade], we fortified them for a virtually inevitable showdown
with the burgeoning PKI."76

Only from recently released documents do we learn that new military aid was en
route as late as July 1965, in the form of a secret contract to deliver two hundred
Aero-Commanders to the Indonesian Army: these were light aircraft suitable for
use in "civic action" or counterinsurgency operations, presumably by the Army
Flying Corps whose senior officers were virtually all trained in the U.S.77 By this
time, the publicly admitted U.S. aid was virtually limited to the completion of an
army communications system and to "civic action" training. It was by using the
army's new communications system, rather than the civilian system in the hands of
Sukarno loyalists, that Suharto on October 1, 1965 was able to implement his swift
purge of Sukarno-Yani loyalists and leftists, while "civic action" officers formed the
hard core of lower-level Gestapu officers in Central Java.78

Before turning to the more covert aspects of U.S. military aid to Indonesia in
1963-65, let us review the overall changes in U.S.-Indonesian relations. Economic
aid was now in abeyance, and military aid tightly channeled so as to strengthen the
army domestically. U.S. government funding had obviously shifted from the
Indonesian state to one of its least loyal components. As a result of agreements
beginning with martial law in 1957, but accelerated by the U.S.-negotiated oil
agreement of 1963, we see exactly the same shift in the flow of payments from U.S.
oil companies. Instead of token royalties to the Sukarno government, the two big
U.S. oil companies in Indonesia, Stanvac and Caltex, now made much larger
payments to the army's oil company, Permina, headed by an eventual political ally
of Suharto, General Ibnu Sutowo; and to a second company, Pertamin, headed by
the anti-PKI and pro-U.S. politician, Chaerul Saleh.79 After Suharto's overthrow of
Sukarno, Fortune wrote that "Sutowo's still small company played a key part in
bankrolling those crucial operations, and the army has never forgotten it."80

U.S. Support for the Suharto Faction Before Gestapu
American officials commenting on the role of U.S. aid in this period have taken credit
for assisting the anti-Communist seizure of power, without ever hinting at any
degree of conspiratorial responsibility in the planning of the bloodbath. The
impression created is that U.S. officials remained aloof from the actual planning of
events, and we can see from recently declassified cable traffic how carefully the
U.S. government fostered this image of detachment from what was happening in
Indonesia.81

In fact, however, the U.S. government was lying about its involvement. In Fiscal
Year 1965, a period when The New York Times claimed "all United States aid to
Indonesia was stopped," the number of MAP (Military Assistance Program)
personnel in Jakarta actually increased, beyond what had been projected, to an
unprecedented high.82 According to figures released in 1966,83 from FY 1963 to
FY 1965 the value of MAP deliveries fell from about fourteen million dollars to just
over two million dollars. Despite this decline, the number of MAP military personnel
remained almost unchanged, approximately thirty, while in FY 1965 civilian
personnel (fifteen) were present for the first time. Whether or not one doubts that
aid deliveries fell off as sharply as the figures would suggest, the MILTAG personnel
figures indicate that their "civic action" program was being escalated, not
decreased.84 We have seen that some months before Gestapu, a Suharto
emissary with past CIA connections (Colonel Jan Walandouw) made contact with
the U.S. government. From as early as May 1965, U.S. military suppliers with CIA
connections (principally Lockheed) were negotiating equipment sales with payoffs
to middlemen, in such a way as to generate payoffs to backers of the hitherto
little-known leader of a new third faction in the army, Major-General Suharto --
rather than to those backing Nasution or Yani, the titular leaders of the armed
forces. Only in the last year has it been confirmed that secret funds administered
by the U.S. Air Force (possibly on behalf of the CIA) were laundered as
"commissions" on sales of Lockheed equipment and services, in order to make
political payoffs to the military personnel of foreign countries.85

A 1976 Senate investigation into these payoffs revealed, almost inadvertently, that
in May 1965, over the legal objections of Lockheed's counsel, Lockheed commissions
in Indonesia had been redirected to a new contract and company set up by the
firm's long-time local agent or middleman.86 Its internal memos at the time show
no reasons for the change, but in a later memo the economic counselor of the U.S.
Embassy in Jakarta is reported as saying that there were "some political
considerations behind it."87 If this is true, it would suggest that in May 1965, five
months before the coup, Lockheed had redirected its payoffs to a new political
eminence, at the risk (as its assistant chief counsel pointed out) of being sued for
default on its former contractual obligations.

The Indonesian middleman, August Munir Dasaad, was "known to have assisted
Sukarno financially since the 1930's."88 In 1965, however, Dasaad was building
connections with the Suharto forces, via a family relative, General Alamsjah, who
had served briefly under Suharto in 1960, after Suharto completed his term at
SESKOAD. Via the new contract, Lockheed, Dasaad and Alamsjah were apparently
hitching their wagons to Suharto's rising star:

When the coup was made during which Suharto replaced Sukarno, Alamsjah, who
controlled certain considerable funds, at once made these available to Suharto,
which obviously earned him the gratitude of the new President. In due course he
was appointed to a position of trust and confidence and today Alamsjah is, one
might say, the second important man after the President.89

Thus in 1966 the U.S. Embassy advised Lockheed it should "continue to use" the
Dasaad-Alamsjah-Suharto connection.90


In July 1965, at the alleged nadir of U.S.-Indonesian aid relations,
Rockwell-Standard had a contractual agreement to deliver two hundred light
aircraft (Aero-Commanders) to the Indonesian Army (not the Air Force) in the
next two months.91 Once again the commission agent on the deal, Bob Hasan, was
a political associate (and eventual business partner) of Suharto.92 More specifically,
Suharto and Bob Hasan established two shipping companies to be operated by the
Central Java army division, Diponegoro. This division, as has long been noticed,
supplied the bulk of the personnel on both sides of the Gestapu coup drama -- both
those staging the coup attempt, and those putting it down. And one of the three
leaders in the Central Java Gestapu movement was Lt. Col. Usman Sastrodibroto,
chief of the Diponegoro Division's "section dealing with extramilitary functions."93

Thus of the two known U.S. military sales contracts from the eve of the Gestapu
Putsch, both involved political payoffs to persons who emerged after Gestapu as
close Suharto allies. The use of this traditional channel for CIA patronage suggests
that the U.S. was not at arm's length from the ugly political developments of 1965,
despite the public indications, from both government spokesmen and the U.S.
business press, that Indonesia was now virtually lost to communism and nothing
could be done about it.

The actions of some U.S. corporations, moreover, made it clear that by early 1965
they expected a significant boost to the U.S. standing in Indonesia. For example, a
recently declassified cable reveals that Freeport Sulphur had by April 1965 reached
a preliminary "arrangement" with Indonesian officials for what would become a $500
million investment in West Papua copper. This gives the lie to the public claim that
the company did not initiate negotiations with Indonesians (the inevitable Ibnu
Sutowo) until February 1966.94 And in September 1965, shortly after World Oil
reported that "indonesia's gas and oil industry appeared to be slipping deeper into
the political morass,"95 the president of a small oil company (Asamera) in a joint
venture with Ibnu Sutowo's Permina purchased $50,000 worth of shares in his own
ostensibly-threatened company. Ironically this double purchase (on September 9
and September 21) was reported in the Wall Street Journal of September 30, 1965,
the day of Gestapu.

The CIA's "[One Word Deleted] Operation" in 1965
Less than a year after Gestapu and the bloodbath, James Reston wrote
appreciatively about them as "A Gleam of Light in Asia":

Washington is being careful not to claim any credit for this change in the sixth
most populous and one of the richest nations in the world, but this does not mean
that Washington had nothing to do with it. There was a great deal more contact
between the anti-Communist forces in that country and at least one very high official
in Washington before and during the Indonesian massacre than is generally
realized.96

As for the CIA in 1965, we have the testimony of former CIA officer Ralph McGehee,
curiously corroborated by the selective censorship of his former CIA employers:

Where the necessary circumstances or proofs are lacking to support U.S.
intervention, the C.I.A. creates the appropriate situations or else invents them and
disseminates its distortions worldwide via its media operations.
A prominent example would be Chile.... Disturbed at the Chilean military's
unwillingness to take action against Allende, the C.I.A. forged a document purporting
to reveal a leftist plot to murder Chilean military leaders. The discovery of this
"plot" was headlined in the media and Allende was deposed and murdered.
There is a similarity between events that precipitated the overthrow of Allende
and what happened in Indonesia in 1965. Estimates of the number of deaths that
occurred as a result of the latter C.I.A. [one word deleted] operation run from
one-half million to more than one million people.97

McGehee claims to have once seen, while reviewing CIA documents in Washington,
a highly classified report on the agency's role in provoking the destruction of the PKI
after Gestapu. It seems appropriate to ask for congressional review and publication
of any such report. If, as is alleged, it recommended such murderous techniques as
a model for future operations, it would appear to document a major turning-point in
the agency's operation history: towards the systematic exploitation of the death
squad operations which, absent during the Brazilian coup of 1964, made the
Vietnam Phoenix counterinsurgency program notorious after 1967, and after 1968
spread from Guatemala to the rest of Latin America.98

McGehee's claims of a CIA psychological warfare operation against Allende are
corroborated by Tad Szulc:

CIA agents in Santiago assisted Chilean military intelligence in drafting bogus
Z-plan documents alleging that Allende and his supporters were planning to behead
Chilean military commanders. These were issued by the junta to justify the coup.99

Indeed the CIA deception operations against Allende appear to have gone even
farther, terrifying both the left and the right with the fear of incipient slaughter by
their enemies. Thus militant trade-unionists as well as conservative generals in Chile
received small cards printed with the ominous words Djakarta se acerca (Jakarta is
approaching).100

This is a model destabilization plan -- to persuade all concerned that they no longer
can hope to be protected by the status quo, and hence weaken the center, while
inducing both right and left towards more violent provocation of each other. Such a
plan appears to have been followed in Laos in 1959-61, where a CIA officer
explained to a reporter that the aim "was to polarize Laos."101 It appears to have
been followed in Indonesia in 1965. Observers like Sundhaussen confirm that to
understand the coup story of October 1965 we must look first of all at the "rumour
market" which in 1965 ... turned out the wildest stories."102 On September 14, two
weeks before the coup, the army was warned that there was a plot to assassinate
army leaders four days later; a second such report was discussed at army
headquarters on September 30.103 But a year earlier an alleged PKI document,
which the PKI denounced as a forgery, had purported to describe a plan to overthrow
"Nasutionists" through infiltration of the army. This "document," which was reported
in a Malaysian newspaper after being publicized by the pro-U.S. politician Chaerul
Saleh104 in mid-December 1964, must have lent credence to Suharto's call for an
army unity meeting the next month.105

The army's anxiety was increased by rumors, throughout 1965, that mainland China
was smuggling arms to the PKI for an imminent revolt. Two weeks before Gestapu,
a story to this effect also appeared in a Malaysian newspaper, citing Bangkok
sources which relied in turn on Hong Kong sources.106 Such international
untraceability is the stylistic hallmark of stories emanating in this period from what
CIA insiders called their "mighty Wurlitzer," the world-wide network of press "assets"
through which the CIA, or sister agencies such as Britain's MI-6, could plant
unattributable disinformation.107 PKI demands for a popular militia or "fifth force,"
and the training of PKI youth at Lubang Buaja, seemed much more sinister to the
Indonesian army in the light of the Chinese arms stories.

But for months before the coup, the paranoia of the PKI had also been played on, by
recurring reports that a CIA-backed "Council of Generals" was plotting to suppress
the PKI. It was this mythical council, of course, that Untung announced as the target
of his allegedly anti-CIA Gestapu coup. But such rumors did not just originate from
anti-American sources; on the contrary, the first authoritative published reference to
such a council was in a column of the Washington journalists Evans and Novak:

As far back as March, General Ibrahim Adjie, commander of the Siliwangi
Division, had been quoted by two American journalists as saying of the Communists:
"we knocked them out before [at Madiun]. We check them and check them again."
The same journalists claimed to have information that "...the Army has quietly
established an advisory commission of five general officers to report to General Jani
... and General Nasution ... on PKI activities."108

Mortimer sees the coincidence that five generals besides Yani were killed by Gestapu
as possibly significant.

But we should also be struck by the revival in the United States of the image of Yani
and Nasution as anti-PKI planners, long after the CIA and U.S. press stories had in
fact written them off as unwilling to act against Sukarno.109 If the elimination by
Gestapu of Suharto's political competitors in the army was to be blamed on the left,
then the scenario required just such a revival of the generals' forgotten
anti-Communist image in opposition to Sukarno. An anomalous unsigned August
1965 profile of Nasution in The New York Times, based on an 1963 interview but
published only after a verbal attack by Nasution on British bases in Singapore, does
just this: it claims (quite incongruously, given the context) that Nasution is
"considered the strongest opponent of Communism in Indonesia"; and adds that
Sukarno, backed by the PKI, "has been pursuing a campaign to neutralize the ...
army as an anti-Communist force."110

In the same month of August 1965, fear of an imminent showdown between "the PKI
and the Nasution group" was fomented in Indonesia by an underground pamphlet;
this was distributed by the CIA's long-time asset, the PSI, whose cadres were by
now deeply involved:

The PKI is combat ready. The Nasution group hope the PKI will be the first to
draw the trigger, but this the PKI will not do. The PKI will not allow itself to be
provoked as in the Madiun Incident. In the end, however, there will be only two
forces left: the PKI and the Nasution group. The middle will have no alternative but to
choose and get protection from the stronger force.111

One could hardly hope to find a better epitome of the propaganda necessary for the
CIA's program of engineering paranoia.

McGehee's article, after censorship by the CIA, focuses more narrowly on the CIA's
role in anti-PKI propaganda alone:

The Agency seized upon this opportunity [Suharto's response to Gestapu] and set
out to destroy the P.K.I.... [eight sentences deleted].... Media fabrications played a
key role in stirring up popular resentment against the P.K.I. Photographs of the
bodies of the dead generals -- badly decomposed -- were featured in all the
newspapers and on television. Stories accompanying the pictures falsely claimed that
the generals had been castrated and their eyes gouged out by Communist women.
This cynically manufactured campaign was designed to foment public anger against
the Communists and set the stage for a massacre.112

McGehee might have added that the propaganda stories of torture by hysterical
women with razor blades, which serious scholars dismiss as groundless, were
revived in a more sophisticated version by a U.S. journalist, John Hughes, who is
now the chief spokesman for the State Department.113

Suharto's forces, particularly Col. Sarwo Edhie of the RPKAD commandos, were
overtly involved in the cynical exploitation of the victims' bodies.114 But some
aspects of the massive propaganda campaign appear to have been orchestrated by
non-Indonesians. A case in point is the disputed editorial in support of Gestapu
which appeared in the October 2 issue of the PKI newspaper Harian Rakjat.
Professors Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey, who have questioned the authenticity
of this issue, have also ruled out the possibility that the newspaper was "an Army
falsification," on the grounds that the army's "competence ... at falsifying party
documents has always been abysmally low."115

The questions raised by Anderson and McVey have not yet been adequately
answered. Why did the PKI show no support for the Gestapu coup while it was in
progress, then rashly editorialize in support of Gestapu after it had been crushed?
Why did the PKI, whose editorial gave support to Gestapu, fail to mobilize its
followers to act on Gestapu's behalf? Why did Suharto, by then in control of Jakarta,
close down all newspapers except this one, and one other left-leaning newspaper
which also served his propaganda ends?116 Why, in other words, did Suharto on
October 2 allow the publication of only two Jakarta newspapers, two which were on
the point of being closed down forever?

As was stated at the outset, it would be foolish to suggest that in 1965 the only
violence came from the U.S. government, the Indonesian military, and their mutual
contacts in British and Japanese intelligence. A longer paper could also discuss the
provocative actions of the PKI, and of Sukarno himself, in this tragedy of social
breakdown. Assuredly, from one point of view, no one was securely in control of
events in this troubled period.117

And yet for two reasons such a fashionably objective summation of events seems
inappropriate. In the first place, as the CIA's own study concedes, we are talking
about "one of the ghastliest and most concentrated bloodlettings of current times,"
one whose scale of violence seems out of all proportion to such well-publicized
left-wing acts as the murder of an army lieutenant at the Bandar Betsy plantation in
May 1965,118 And, in the second place, the scenario described by McGehee for
1965 can be seen as not merely responding to the provocations, paranoia, and
sheer noise of events in that year, but as actively encouraging and channeling them.

It should be noted that former CIA Director William Colby has repeatedly denied that
there was CIA or other U.S. involvement in the massacre of 1965. (In the absence
of a special CIA Task Force, Colby, as head of the CIA's Far Eastern Division from
1962-66, would normally have been responsible for the CIA's operations in
Indonesia.) Colby's denial is however linked to the discredited story of a PKI plot to
seize political power, a story that he revived in 1978:

Indonesia exploded, with a bid for power by the largest Communist Party in the
world outside the curtain, which killed the leadership of the army with Sukarno's
tacit approval and then was decimated in reprisal. CIA provided a steady flow of
reports on the process in Indonesia, although it did not have any role in the course
of events themselves.119

It is important to resolve the issue of U.S. involvement in this systematic murder
operation, and particularly to learn more about the CIA account of this which
McGehee claims to have seen. McGehee tells us: "The Agency was extremely proud
of its successful [one word deleted] and recommended it as a model for future
operations [one-half sentence deleted]."120 Ambassador Green reports of an
interview with Nixon in 1967:

The Indonesian experience had been one of particular interest to [Nixon] because
things had gone well in Indonesia. I think he was very interested in that whole
experience as pointing to the way we [!] should handle our relationships on a wider
basis in Southeast Asia generally, and maybe in the world.121

Such unchallenged assessments help explain the role of Indonesians in the
Nixon-sponsored overthrow of Sihanouk in Cambodia in 1970, the use of the
Jakarta scenario for the overthrow of Allende in Chile in 1973, and the U.S.
sponsorship today of the death squad regimes in Central America.122

University of California, Berkeley, U.S.A., December 1984

1. The difficulties of this analysis, based chiefly on the so-called "evidence" presented at the Mahmilub trials, will be obvious to anyone who has tried to reconcile the conflicting accounts of Gestapu in, e.g., the official Suharto account by Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh, and the somewhat less fanciful CIA study of 1968, both referred to later. I shall draw only on those parts of the Mahmilub evidence which limit or discredit their anti-PKI thesis. For interpretation of the Mahmilub data, cf. especially Coen Holtzappel, "The 30 September Movement," Journal of Contemporary Asia, IX, 2 (1979), pp. 216-40. The case for general skepticism is argued by Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 421-3; and more forcefully, by Julie Southwood and Patrick Flanagan, Indonesia: Law, Propaganda, and Terror (London: Zed Press, 1983), pp. 126-34.

2. At his long-delayed trial in 1978, Gestapu plotter Latief confirmed earlier revelations that he had visited his old commander Suharto on the eve of the Gestapu kidnappings. He claimed that he raised with Suharto the existence of an alleged right-wing "Council of Generals" plotting to seize power, and informed him "of a movement which was intended to thwart the plan of the generals' council for a coup d'etat" (Anon., "The Latief Case: Suharto's Involvement Revealed," Journal of Contemporary Asia, IX, 2 [1979], pp. 248-50). For a more comprehensive view of Suharto's involvement in Gestapu, cf. especially W.F. Wertheim, "Whose Plot? New Light on the 1965 Events," Journal of Contemporary Asia, IX, 2 (1979), pp. 197-215; Holtzappel, "The 30 September," in contrast, points more particularly to intelligence officers close to the banned Murba party of Chaerul Saleh and Adam Malik: cf. fn. 104.

3. The three phases are: (1) "Gestapu," the induced left-wing "coup"; (2) "KAP-Gestapu," or the anti-Gestapu "response," massacring the PKI; (3) the progressive erosion of Sukarno's remaining power. This paper will chiefly discuss Gestapu / KAP-Gestapu, the first two phases. To call the first phase by itself a "coup" is in my view an abuse of terminology: there is no real evidence that in this phase political power changed hands or that this was the intention.

4. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Research Study: Indonesia -- The Coup that Backfired, 1968 (cited hereafter as CIA Study), p. 71n.

5. Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 79-81.

6. In addition, one of the two Gestapu victims in Central Java (Colonel Katamso) was the only non-PKI official of rank to attend the PKI's nineteenth anniversary celebration in Jogjakarta in May 1964: Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, p. 432. Ironically, the belated "discovery" of his corpse was used to trigger off the purge of his PKI contacts.

7. Four of the six pro-Yani representatives in January were killed along with Yani on October 1. Of the five anti-Yani representatives in January, we shall see that at least three were prominent in "putting down" Gestapu and completing the elimination of the Yani-Sukarno loyalists (the three were Suharto, Basuki Rachmat, and Sudirman of SESKOAD, the Indonesian Army Staff and Command School): Crouch, The Army, p. 81n.

8. While Nasution's daughter and aide were murdered, he was able to escape without serious injury, and support the ensuing purge.

9. Indonesia, 22 (October 1976), p. 165 (CIA Memorandum of 22 March 1961 from Richard M. Bissell, Attachment B). By 1965 this disillusionment was heightened by Nasution's deep opposition to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

10. Crouch, The Army, p. 40; Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 221-2.

11. I shall assume for this condensed argument that Untung was the author, or at least approved, of the statements issued in his name. Scholars who see Untung as a dupe of Gestapu's controllers note that Untung was nowhere near the radio station broadcasting in his name, and that he appears to have had little or no influence over the task force which occupied it (under Captain Suradi of the intelligence service of Colonel Latief's Brigade): Holtzappel, pp. 218, 231-2, 236-7. I have no reason to contradict those careful analysts of Gestapu -- such as Wertheim, "Whose Plot?" p. 212, and Holtzappel, "The 30 September," p. 231 -- who conclude that Untung personally was sincere, and manipulated by other dalangs such as Sjam.

12. Broadcast of 7:15 a.m. October 1; Indonesia 1 (April 1966), p. 134; Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967 (Kuala Lumpur and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 196.

13. Ibid., p. 201.

14. Broadcasts of October 1 and 4, 1965; Indonesia 1 (April 1966), pp. 158-9.

15. CIA Study, p. 2; O.G. Roeder, The Smiling General: President Soeharto of Indonesia (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1970), p. 12, quoting Suharto himself: "On my way to KOSTRAD HQ [Suharto's HQ] I passed soldiers in green berets who were placed under KOSTRAD command but who did not salute me."

16. Anderson and McVey concluded that Sukarno, Air Force Chief Omar Dhani, PKI Chairman Aidit (the three principal political targets of Suharto's anti-Gestapu "response") were rounded up by the Gestapu plotters in the middle of the night, and taken to Halim air force base, about one mile from the well at Lubang Buaja where the generals' corpses were discovered. In 1966 they surmised that this was "to seal the conspirators' control of the bases," and to persuade Sukarno "to go along with" the conspirators' plans (Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey, A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia [Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1971], pp. 19-21). An alternative hypothesis of course is that Gestapu, by bringing these men together against their will, created the semblance of a PKI-air force-Sukarno conspiracy which would later be exploited by Suharto. Sukarno's presence at Halim "was later to provide Sukarno's critics with some of their handiest ammunition" (John Hughes, The End of Sukarno [London: Angus and Robertson, 1978], p. 54).

17. CIA Study, p. 2; cf. p. 65: "At the height of the coup ... the troops of the rebels [in Central Java] were estimated to have the strength of only one battalion; during the next two days, these forces gradually melted away."

18. Rudolf Mrazek, The United States and the Indonesian Military, 1945-1966 (Prague: Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, 1978), vol. II, p. 172. These battalions, comprising the bulk of the 3rd Paratroop Brigade, also supplied the bulk of the troops used to put down Gestapu in Jakarta. The subordination of these two factions in this supposed civil war to a single close command structure under Suharto is cited to explain how Suharto was able to restore order in the city without gunfire. Meanwhile out at the Halim air force base an alleged gun battle between the 454th (Green Beret) and RPKAD (Red Beret) paratroops went off "without the loss of a single man" (CIA Study, p. 60). In Central Java, also, power "changed hands silently and peacefully," with "an astonishing lack of violence" (CIA Study, p. 66).

19. Ibid., p. 60n; Arthur J. Dommen, "The Attempted Coup in Indonesia," China Quarterly, January-March 1966, p. 147. The first "get-acquainted" meeting of the Gestapu plotters is placed in the Indonesian chronology of events from "sometimes before August 17, 1965"; cf. Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh, The Coup Attempt of the "September 30 Movement" in Indonesia (Jakarta: [Pembimbing Masa, 1968], p. 13); in the CIA Study, this meeting is dated September 6 (p. 112). Neither account allows more than a few weeks to plot a coup in the world's fifth most populous country.

20. Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, p. 429.

21. Of the six General Staff officers appointed along with Yani, three (Suprapto, D.I. Pandjaitan, and S. Parman) were murdered. Of the three survivors, two (Mursjid and Pranoto) were removed by Suharto in the next eight months. The last member of Yani's staff, Djamin Gintings, was used by Suharto during the establishment of the New Order, and ignored thereafter.

22. Howard Palfrey Jones, Indonesia: The Possible Dream (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1971), p. 391; cf. Arnold Brackman, The Communist Collapse in Indonesia (New York: Norton, 1969), pp. 118-9.

23. Crouch, The Army, p. 150n.

24. Ibid., pp. 140-53; for the disputed case of Bali, even Robert Shaplen, a journalist close to U.S. official sources, concedes that "The Army began it" (Time Out of Hand [New York: Harper and Row, 1969], p. 125). The slaughter in East Java "also really got started when the RPKAD arrived, not just Central Java and Bali" (letter from Benedict Anderson).

25. Sundhaussen, The Road, pp. 171, 178-9, 210, 228; Donald Hindley, "Alirans and the Fall of the Older Order," Indonesia, 25 (April 1970), pp. 40-41.

26. Sundhaussen, The Road, p. 219.

27. "In 1965 it [the BND, or intelligence service of the Federal Republic of Germany] assisted Indonesia's military secret service to suppress a left-wing Putsch in Djakarta, delivering sub-machine guns, radio equipment and money to the value of 300,000 marks" (Heinz Hoehne and Hermann Zolling, The General Was a Spy [New York: Bantam, 1972], p. xxxiii).

28. We should not be misled by the CIA's support of the 1958 rebellion into assuming that all U.S. Government plotting against Sukarno and the PKI must have been CIA-based (cf. fn. 122).

29. Daniel Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University press, 1966), p. 12. For John Foster Dulles' hostility to Indonesian unity in 1953, cf. Leonard Mosley, Dulles (New York: The Dial Press / James Wade, 1978), p. 437.

30. Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalogue (Woodbridge, Connecticut: Research Publications, 1982), 001191.

31. As the head of the PKI's secret Special Bureau, responsible only to Aidit, Sjam by his own testimony provided leadership to the "progressive officers" of Gestapu. The issue of PKI involvement in Gestapu thus rests on the question of whether Sjam was manipulating the Gestapu leadership on behalf of the PKI, or the PKI leadership on behalf of the army. There seems to be no disagreement that Sjam was (according to the CIA Study, p. 107) a longtime "double agent" and professed "informer for the Djakarta Military Command." Wertheim (p. 203) notes that in the 1950s Sjam "was a cadre of the PSI," and "had also been in touch with Lt. Col. Suharto, today's President, who often came to stay in his house in Jogja."

For additional bibliographies, please refer to this link: namebase.org/scott.html

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theaccidentaltou...
post Jan 6 2006, 11:40 AM
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Ex-agents say CIA compiled death lists for Indonesians
After 25 years, Americans speak of their
role in exterminating Communist Party

by Kathy Kadane, States News Service, 1990

WASHINGTON -- The U.S. government played a significant role in one of the worst
massacres of the century by supplying the names of thousands of Communist Party
leaders to the Indonesian army, which hunted down the leftists and killed them,
former U.S. diplomats say.

For the first time, U.S. officials acknowledge that in 1965 they systematically
compiled comprehensive lists of Communist operatives, from top echelons down to
village cadres. As many as 5,000 names were furnished to the Indonesian army,
and the Americans later checked off the names of those who had been killed or
captured, according to the U.S. officials.

The killings were part of a massive bloodletting that took an estimated 250,000 lives.

The purge of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) was part of a U.S. drive to ensure
that Communists did not come to power in the largest country in Southeast Asia,
where the United States was already fighting an undeclared war in Vietnam.
Indonesia is the fifth most-populous country in the world.

Silent for a quarter-century, former senior U.S. diplomats and CIA officers described
in lengthy interviews how they aided Indonesian President Suharto, then army
leader, in his attack on the PKI.

"It really was a big help to the army," said Robert J. Martens, a former member of
the U.S. Embassy's political section who is now a consultant to the State Department.
"They probably killed a lot of people, and I probably have a lot of blood on my
hands, but that's not all bad. There's a time when you have to strike hard at a
decisive moment."

White House and State Department spokesmen declined comment on the disclosures.

Although former deputy CIA station chief Joseph Lazarsky and former diplomat
Edward Masters, who was Martens' boss, said CIA agents contributed in drawing up
the death lists, CIA spokesman Mark Mansfield said, "There is no substance to the
allegation that the CIA was involved in the preparation and/or distribution of a list
that was used to track down and kill PKI members. It is simply not true."

Indonesian Embassy spokesman Makarim Wibisono said he had no personal
knowledge of events described by former U.S. officials. "In terms of fighting the
Communists, as far as I'm concerned, the Indonesian people fought by themselves
to eradicate the Communists," he said.

Martens, an experienced analyst of communist affairs, headed an embassy group of
State Department and CIA officers that spent two years compiling the lists. He later
delivered them to an army intermediary.

People named on the lists were captured in overwhelming numbers, Martens said,
adding, "It's a big part of the reason the PKI has never come back."

The PKI was the third-largest Communist Party in the world, with an estimated 3
million members. Through affiliated organizations such as labor and youth groups it
claimed the loyalties of another 17 million.

In 1966 the Washington Post published an estimate that 500,000 were killed in the
purge and the brief civil war it triggered. In a 1968 report, the CIA estimated there
had been 250,000 deaths, and called the carnage "one of the worst mass murders
of the 20th century."

U.S. Embassy approval
Approval for the release of the names came from the top U.S. Embassy officials,
including former Ambassador Marshall Green, deputy chief of mission Jack Lydman
and political section chief Edward Masters, the three acknowledged in interviews.

Declassified embassy cables and State Department reports from early October 1965,
before the names were turned over, show that U.S. officials knew Suharto had
begun roundups of PKI cadres, and that the embassy had unconfirmed reports that
firing squads were being formed to kill PKI prisoners.

Former CIA Director William Colby, in an interview, compared the embassy's
campaign to identify the PKI leadership to the CIA's Phoenix Program in Vietnam.
In 1965, Colby was the director of the CIA's Far East division and was responsible
for directing U.S. covert strategy in Asia.

"That's what I set up in the Phoenix Program in Vietnam -- that I've been kicked
around for a lot," he said. "That's exactly what it was. It was an attempt to identify
the structure" of the Communist Party.

Phoenix was a joint U.S.-South Vietnamese program set up by the CIA in December
1967 that aimed at neutralizing members of the National Liberation Front, the
Vietcong political cadres. It was widely criticized for alleged human rights abuses.

"You shoot them"
"The idea of identifying the local apparatus was designed to -- well, you go out and
get them to surrender, or you capture or you shoot them," Colby said of the Phoenix
Program. "I mean, it was a war, and they were fighting. So it was really aimed at
providing intelligence for operations rather than a big picture of the thing."

In 1962, when he took over as chief of the CIA's Far East division, Colby said he
discovered the United States did not have comprehensive lists of PKI activists. Not
having the lists "could have been criticized as a gap in the intelligence system," he
said, adding they were useful for "operation planning" and provided a picture of how
the party was organized. Without such lists, he said, "you're fighting blind."

Asked if the CIA had been responsible for sending Martens, a foreign service officer,
to Jakarta in 1963 to compile the lists, Colby said, "Maybe, I don't know. Maybe we
did it. I've forgotten."

The lists were a detailed who's-who of the leadership of the party of 3 million
members, Martens said. They included names of provincial, city and other local PKI
committee members, and leaders of the "mass organizations," such as the PKI
national labor federation, women's and youth groups.

Better information
"I know we had a lot more information" about the PKI "than the Indonesians
themselves," Green said. Martens "told me on a number of occasions that ... the
government did not have very good information on the Communist setup, and he
gave me the impression that this information was superior to anything they had."

Masters, the embassy's political section chief, said he believed the army had lists of
its own, but they were not as comprehensive as the American lists. He said he could
not remember whether the decision to release the names had been cleared with
Washington.

The lists were turned over piecemeal, Martens said, beginning at the top of the
communist organization. Martens supplied thousands of names to an Indonesian
emissary over a number of months, he said. The emissary was an aide to Adam
Malik, an Indonesian minister who was an ally of Suharto in the attack on the
Communists.

Interviewed in Jakarta, the aide, Tirta Kentjana ("Kim") Adhyatman, confirmed he
had met with Martens and received lists of thousands of names, which he in turn
gave to Malik. Malik passed them on to Suharto's headquarters, he said.

"Shooting list"
Embassy officials carefully recorded the subsequent destruction of the PKI
organization. Using Martens' lists as a guide, they checked off names of captured
and assassinated PKI leaders, tracking the steady dismantling of the party
apparatus, former U.S. officials said.

Information about who had been captured and killed came from Suharto's
headquarters, according to Joseph Lazarsky, deputy CIA station chief in Jakarta in
1965. Suharto's Jakarta headquarters was the central collection point for military
reports from around the country detailing the capture and killing of PKI leaders,
Lazarsky said.

"We were getting a good account in Jakarta of who was being picked up," Lazarsky
said. "The army had a 'shooting list' of about 4,000 or 5,000 people."

Detention centers were set up to hold those who were not killed immediately.

"They didn't have enough goon squads to zap them all, and some individuals were
valuable for interrogation," Lazarsky said. "The infrastructure was zapped almost
immediately. We knew what they were doing. We knew they would keep a few and
save them for the kangaroo courts, but Suharto and his advisers said, if you keep
them alive, you have to feed them."

Masters, the chief of the political section, said, "We had these lists" constructed by
Martens, "and we were using them to check off what was happening to the party,
what the effect" of the killings "was on it."

Lazarsky said the checkoff work was also carried out at the CIA's intelligence
directorate in Washington.

Leadership destroyed
By the end of January 1966, Lazarsky said, the checked-off names were so
numerous the CIA analysts in Washington concluded the PKI leadership had been
destroyed.

"No one cared, as long as they were Communists, that they were being butchered,"
said Howard Federspiel, who in 1965 was the Indonesia expert at the State
Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. "No one was getting very worked
up about it."

Asked about the checkoffs, Colby said, "We came to the conclusion that with the sort
of Draconian way it was carried out, it really set them" -- the communists -- "back
for years."

Asked if he meant the checkoffs were proof that the PKI leadership had been caught
or killed, he said, "Yeah, yeah, that's right, ... the leading elements, yeah."




More from Kathy Kadane...
A Letter to the Editor, New York Review of Books, April 10, 1997

To the Editors:

I very much admired Ms. Laber's piece on Indonesian politics and the origins of the
Soeharto regime. In connection with her assertion that little is known about a CIA
(or US) role in the 1965 coup and the army massacre that followed, I would like to
make your readers aware of a compelling body of evidence about this that is
publicly available, but the public access to it is little known.

It consists of a series of on-the-record, taped interviews with the men who headed
the US embassy in Jakarta or were at high levels in Washington agencies in 1965.
I published a news story based on the interviews in The Washington Post ("U.S.
Officials' Lists Aided Indonesian Bloodbath in '60s," May 21, 1990), and have since
transferred the tapes, my notes, and a small collection of documents, including a
few declassified cables on which the story was based, to the National Security
Archive in Washington, D.C. The Archive is a nongovernmental research institute
and library, located at the George Washington University.

The former officials interviewed included Ambassador Marshall Green, Deputy Chief
of Mission Jack Lydman, Political Counsellor (later Ambassador) Edward E. Masters,
Robert Martens (an analyst of the Indonesian left working under Masters'
supervision), and (then) director of the Central Intelligence Agency's Far East
division, William Colby.

The tapes, along with notes of conversations, show that the United States furnished
critical intelligence -- the names of thousands of leftist activists, both Communist
and non-Communist -- to the Indonesian Army that were then used in the bloody
manhunt.

There were other details that illustrate the depth of US involvement and culpability
in the killings which I learned from former top-level embassy officials, but have not
previously published. For example, the US provided key logistical equipment, hastily
shipped in at the last minute as Soeharto weighed the risky decision to attack.
Jeeps were supplied by the Pentagon to speed troops over Indonesia's notoriously
bad roads, along with "dozens and dozens" of field radios that the Army lacked. As
Ms. Laber noted, the US (namely, the Pentagon) also supplied "arms." Cables show
these were small arms, used for killing at close range.

The supply of radios is perhaps the most telling detail. They served not only as field
communications but also became an element of a broad, US intelligence-gathering
operation constructed as the manhunt went forward. According to a former embassy
official, the Central Intelligence Agency hastily provided the radios --
state-of-the-art Collins KWM-2s, high-frequency single-sideband transceivers, the
highest-powered mobile unit available at that time to the civilian and commercial
market. The radios, stored at Clark Field in the Philippines, were secretly flown by
the US Air Force into Indonesia. They were then distributed directly to Soeharto's
headquarters -- called by its acronym KOSTRAD -- by Pentagon representatives. The
radios plugged a major hole in Army communications: at that critical moment, there
were no means for troops on Java and the out-islands to talk directly with Jakarta.

While the embassy told reporters the US had no information about the operation, the
opposite was true. There were at least two direct sources of information. During the
weeks in which the American lists were being turned over to the Army, embassy
officials met secretly with men from Soeharto's intelligence unit at regular intervals
concerning who had been arrested or killed. In addition, the US more generally had
information from its systematic monitoring of Army radios. According to a former US
official, the US listened in to the broadcasts on the US-supplied radios for weeks as
the manhunt went forward, overhearing, among other things, commands from
Soeharto's intelligence unit to kill particular persons at given locations.

The method by which the intercepts were accomplished was also described. The
mobile radios transmitted to a large, portable antenna in front of KOSTRAD (also
hastily supplied by the US -- I was told it was flown in in a C-130 aircraft). The CIA
made sure the frequencies the Army would use were known in advance to the
National Security Agency. NSA intercepted the broadcasts at a site in Southeast Asia,
where its analysts subsequently translated them. The intercepts were then sent on
to Washington, where analysts merged them with reports from the embassy. The
combined reporting, intercepts plus "human" intelligence, was the primary basis for
Washington's assessment of the effectiveness of the manhunt as it destroyed the
organizations of the left, including, inter alia, the Indonesian Communist Party, the
PKI.

A word about the relative importance of the American lists. It appears the CIA had
some access prior to 1965 to intelligence files on the PKI housed at the G-2 section
of the Indonesian Army, then headed by Major-General S. Parman. CIA officials
had been dealing with Parman about intelligence concerning the PKI, among other
matters, in the years prior to the coup, according to a former US official who was
involved (Parman was killed in the coup). The former official, whose account was
corroborated by others whom I interviewed, said that the Indonesian lists, or files,
were considered inadequate by US analysts because they identified PKI officials at
the "national" level, but failed to identify thousands who ran the party at the regional
and municipal levels, or who were secret operatives, or had some other standing,
such as financier.

When asked about the possible reason for this apparent inadequacy, former US
Ambassador Marshall Green, in a December 1989 interview, characterized his
understanding this way:

I know that we had a lot more information than the Indonesians themselves....
For one thing, it would have been rather dangerous [for the Indonesian military to
construct such a list] because the Communist Party was so pervasive and [the
intelligence gatherers] would be fingered...because of the people up the line [the
higher-ups, some of whom sympathized with the PKI]. In the [Indonesian] Air Force,
it would have been lethal to do that. And probably that would be true for the police,
the Marines, the Navy -- in the Army, it depended. My guess is that once this thing
broke, the Army was desperate for information as to who was who [in the PKI].

By the end of January 1966, US intelligence assessments comparing the American
lists with the reports of those arrested or killed showed the Army had destroyed the
PKI. The general attitude was one of great relief: "Nobody cared" about the butchery
and mass arrests because the victims were Communists, one Washington official
told me.

-- Kathy Kadane

direct link: namebase.org/kadane.html
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theaccidentaltou...
post Jan 6 2006, 12:04 PM
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A Coffee break...

Gestapu is directly linked to Suharto. CIA had a hand on the formation
of this entity, designed to swiftly exterminate PKI. To CIA's surprise,
the whole plan worked like a charm- possibly their best covert operation
ever, after the failure of Allende's "Track Two Operation" and The Gulf of
Tonkin "incident".

The irony of it all: Suharto virtually killed all of his worthy competitors, the
members of the General Council, but, not only that, he was succeeding in
laying the blame on the PKI, yet his hands were perceived to be clean by
the mostly dazed and confused public.

Although Gen. Ahmad Yani grew wary about PKI's ever increasing influence in
Indonesia's socio-political world, he and the General Council members remained
very loyal to Sukarno. In CIA's eyes, Ahmad Yani was a constitutionalist, meaning
he would only follow steps permitted by the Constitution. So, CIA needs somebody
they could trust for carrying out their objective: stopping the advance of
communism in this vital country in Southeast Asia at all costs. Nasution could not
be trusted to carry a massive operation because he was more loyal to Sukarno
than he was to CIA's objective. Then, CIA had received a gift from heaven. It
was the triumvirate of Dasaad-Alamsjah-Suharto. We had here persons who put
their greeds and/or ambitions above others, including innocent lives. The rest is
history: one of the bloodiest mass killing in human history.

The main perpetrator? The lucifer Suharto is still alive and well. We should pray
that all those innocent lives he had killed directly or indirectly, thousands of
them, would haunt him till he dies.



TAT

This post has been edited by theaccidentaltourist: Jan 6 2006, 07:19 PM
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purnomor
post Jan 6 2006, 07:10 PM
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QUOTE (theaccidentaltourist @ Jan 6 2006, 12:04 PM)
A Coffee break...

What's wrong, TAT. Was copying and pasting from the internet too tiresome for you?

Again, you've shown pretty much zero knowledge on this topic. Where's all your "research" if you can only copy and paste online? Any 8-year-old kid could do what you just did.

QUOTE
Gestapu is directly linked to Suharto. CIA had a hand on the formation
of this entity, designed to swiftly exterminate PKI.


Wrong. Actually nowhere in the article was mentioned that Suharto has direct link with Gestapu:

QUOTE (theaccidentaltourist @ Jan 6 2006, 11:10 AM)
Debate continues over the origins of the coup attempt called Gestapu. Was it the
result of CIA machinations, a takeover maneuver by General Suharto, a revolt by
leftist officers under the control of the PKI, a power play by the People's Republic
of China, a pre-emptive strike by Sukarno loyalists to prevent a move by officers
friendly to the CIA, some combination of these factors, or others as yet unknown?
I confess to no inside knowledge of the Gestapu.



QUOTE
To CIA's surprise,
the whole plan worked like a charm- possibly their best covert operation
ever, after the failure of Allende's "Track Two Operation" and The Gulf of
Tonkin "incident".


LOL, read your history right, the overthrow of Allende by CIA was very successful and it happened in 1973, years AFTER Gestapu.

QUOTE
The irony of it all: Suharto virtually killed all of his worthy competitors, the
members of the General Council, but, not only that, he was succeeding in
laying the blame on the PKI, yet his hands were perceived to be clean by
the mostly dazed and confused public.


Wrong. There was no "Generals Council". The idea of "Generals Council" was born out of the "Gilchrist Letter", a letter proven to be faked by the communist Czechoslovakian intelligence service. The "Generals' Council" is a communist propaganda attempt, a subject written about for almost everyday in PKI's newspaper Harian Rakjat, to discredit the army leaders that is oppossed to PKI's policies.

There is no doubt that PKI was responsible for the generals' murders as all PKI's leadership was at Halim AF Base (the coup plotters' HQ) and the bodies of the generals were found in Lubang Buaja, a military practice area for Gerwani and Pemuda Rakjat, two armed PKI outfits to train for the Malaysian Confrontation.

It is also undeniable that as the coup faltered later on October 1, PKI's leadership flew out of Halim AF Base to Solo, where several Central Javanese cities had fallen under PKI control that day.

QUOTE
Although Gen. Ahmad Yani grew wary about PKI's ever increasing influence in
Indonesia's socio-political world, he and the General Council members remained
very loyal to Sukarno. In CIA's eyes, Ahmad Yani was a constitutionalist, meaning
he would only follow steps permitted by the Constitution. So, CIA needs somebody
they could trust for carrying out their objective: stopping the advance of
communism in this vital country in Southeast Asia. Nasution could not be trusted
to carry a massive operation because he was more loyal to Sukarno than he
was to CIA's objective.

LOL, you make it as if Indonesia was ruled by CIA. The truth is the CIA is pretty much an incompetent organisation. Just look at how sloppy they were in backing the 1958 PRRI-Permesta rebellion. Indonesian navy managed to shoot down a CIA pilot Allen Pope and extort US$ 1 million from USA for his release. CIA has no capability in controlling Indonesian govt and army.

QUOTE
Then, CIA had received a gift from heaven.  It was the
triumvirate of Dasaad-Alamsjah-Suharto. The rest is history:  one of the bloodiest
mass killing in human history. 


Actually, all CIA did was to give some money and the list of some known PKI members to Suharto after it is clear that this previously unknown general was going to wipe out the communists as "revenge" for PKI murdering the generals. The money might be useful, but the army should already have list of PKI members by themselves without needing CIA help.

BTW Daudsjah and Alamsjah was just some rich guy who used to support Sukarno, but then switched to Suharto in 1966 as the general begin to look like the winning horse.

QUOTE
The main perpetrator? The lucifer Suharto is still alive and well. We should pray
that all those innocent lives he had killed directly and indirectly, thousands of
them, would haunt him till he dies.
TAT
*


The G30S/PKI murders was indeed done by PKI, but their "Revolutionary Government" plans were thwarted by Sukarno and Suharto. Suharto then proceeded to wipe out the communists as "revenge", with some help from USA. For two years (1965-1967), Suharto slowly but surely begin to dethrone Sukarno, eventually getting the president impeached in 1967.
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theaccidentaltou...
post Jan 6 2006, 08:52 PM
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QUOTE (purnomor @ Jan 6 2006, 05:10 PM)
Wrong. Actually nowhere in the article was mentioned that Suharto has direct link with Gestapu:


That's my conclusion. Can you read the bibliography?


2. At his long-delayed trial in 1978, Gestapu plotter Latief confirmed earlier
revelations that he had visited his old commander Suharto on the eve of the
Gestapu kidnappings. He claimed that he raised with Suharto the existence of an
alleged right-wing "Council of Generals" plotting to seize power, and informed
him "of a movement which was intended to thwart the plan of the generals'
council for a coup d'etat" (Anon., "The Latief Case: Suharto's Involvement
Revealed," Journal of Contemporary Asia, IX, 2 [1979], pp. 248-50).
For a more comprehensive view of Suharto's involvement in Gestapu, cf. especially
W.F. Wertheim, "Whose Plot? New Light on the 1965 Events," Journal of
Contemporary Asia, IX, 2 (1979), pp. 197-215; Holtzappel, "The 30 September," in
contrast, points more particularly to intelligence officers close to the banned Murba
party of Chaerul Saleh and Adam Malik: cf. fn. 104.

QUOTE
LOL, read your history right, the overthrow of Allende by CIA was very successful and it happened in 1973, years AFTER Gestapu.


I don't know what you're talking about? Too much dope in your brain, so you
can't connect two and two together? Too much @$$ kissing to suharto? I was
talking about "Track Two" operation of the "two track" covert operation by the
CIA to prevent Allende to assume Chile's presidency circa 1970. Allende became
the president of Chile, thus the tightly coordinated and highly secretive operation
failed to accomplish its objective. Do you understand know, or should I spell it
word by word, no...', make it alphabet by alphabet, just to make it easier on
your brain? Pinochet did overthrew Allende in 1973, but that's a different story and
different subject altogether.

QUOTE
It is also undeniable that as the coup faltered later on October 1, PKI's leadership flew out of Halim AF Base to Solo, where several Central Javanese cities had fallen under PKI control that day.

Says who?

from bibliography...
17. CIA Study, p. 2; cf. p. 65: "At the height of the coup ... the troops of the rebels
[in Central Java] were estimated to have the strength of only one battalion; during
the next two days, these forces gradually melted away."

The army of one batallion taking over Central Java? Yeah right..., pig does fly in
your universe.

16. Anderson and McVey concluded that Sukarno, Air Force Chief Omar Dhani, PKI
Chairman Aidit (the three principal political targets of Suharto's anti-Gestapu
"response") were rounded up by the Gestapu plotters in the middle of the night,
and taken to Halim air force base, about one mile from the well at Lubang Buaja
where the generals' corpses were discovered. In 1966 they surmised that this was
"to seal the conspirators' control of the bases," and to persuade Sukarno "to go
along with" the conspirators' plans (Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey, A
Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia
[Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1971], pp. 19-21). An alternative
hypothesis of course is that Gestapu, by bringing these men together against their
will, created the semblance of a PKI-air force-Sukarno conspiracy which would
later be exploited by Suharto. Sukarno's presence at Halim "was later to provide
Sukarno's critics with some of their handiest ammunition" (John Hughes, The End of
Sukarno [London: Angus and Robertson, 1978], p. 54).


Purnomor who lives in his own universe, no..., make it suharto's universe. You can
continue kissing his asses, there'll be a lot of good things going for you for your
valiant effort of washing suharto's hog.

TAT

This post has been edited by theaccidentaltourist: Jan 6 2006, 08:57 PM
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purnomor
post Jan 7 2006, 12:52 AM
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QUOTE (theaccidentaltourist @ Jan 6 2006, 08:52 PM)
That's my conclusion. Can you read the bibliography?
2. At his long-delayed trial in 1978, Gestapu plotter Latief confirmed earlier
revelations that he had visited his old commander Suharto on the eve of the
Gestapu kidnappings. He claimed that he raised with Suharto the existence of an
alleged right-wing "Council of Generals" plotting to seize power, and informed
him "of a movement which was intended to thwart the plan of the generals'
council for a coup d'etat" (Anon., "The Latief Case: Suharto's Involvement
Revealed," Journal of Contemporary Asia, IX, 2 [1979], pp. 248-50).
For a more comprehensive view of Suharto's involvement in Gestapu, cf. especially
W.F. Wertheim, "Whose Plot? New Light on the 1965 Events," Journal of
Contemporary Asia, IX, 2 (1979), pp. 197-215; Holtzappel, "The 30 September," in
contrast, points more particularly to intelligence officers close to the banned Murba
party of Chaerul Saleh and Adam Malik: cf. fn. 104.


What's wrong with you, too much copying and pasting mucked up your reading skills? Do you even read the stuff you just copy and paste?

The passage you copy and paste actually confirms what I've said in my original thread.

It contains communist Colonel Latief's confession that he participated in the generals' murders and that he informed Suharto the day before in order to keep him at least neutral during the operation. That's why Suharto was not targetted, bcoz Col Latief convinced the communist plotters that Suharto would remain neutral (since Suharto was known as Sukarno-loyalist, and hence he won't disagree with an operation that's supposed to "save" Sukarno).

Your conclusion that bcoz Suharto was informed by one of the kidnappers ONE DAY BEFORE, then somehow he is the one BEHIND the operation, is totally illogical.


QUOTE
I don't know what you're talking about? Too much dope in your brain, so you
can't connect two and two together? Too much @$$ kissing to suharto?

Only idiots do personal attack to cover-up their incompetence biggrin.gif


QUOTE
I was
talking about "Track Two" operation of the "two track" covert operation by the
CIA to prevent Allende to assume Chile's presidency circa 1970. Allende became
the president of Chile, thus the tightly coordinated and highly secretive operation
failed to accomplish its objective. Do you understand know, or should I spell it
word by word, no...', make it alphabet by alphabet, just to make it easier on
your brain? Pinochet did overthrew Allende in 1973, but that's a different story and
different subject altogether.

It is obvious it is your brain that have a problem. Allende became president in 1970, years AFTER Gestapu. You do know which year comes first, don't you? Your statement saying Gestapu as a "CIA operation" AFTER Allende is crazy.


QUOTE
Says who?

from bibliography...
17. CIA Study, p. 2; cf. p. 65: "At the height of the coup ... the troops of the rebels
[in Central Java] were estimated to have the strength of only one battalion; during
the next two days, these forces gradually melted away."

The army of one batallion taking over Central Java? Yeah right..., pig does fly in
your universe.


You are wrong again, TAT:

1) Pigs cannot fly.

2) Semarang (1-2 October 1965), Salatiga (1-4 October 1965), Yogyakarta (1-4 October 1965), and Solo (1-4 October 1965) was under rule of G30S/PKI rebels. This is possible because Central Java was a communist stronghold (PKI won 30% of the votes there in 1955), whereby the mayors of Semarang and Solo were members of PKI (Cribb, Historical Atlas of Indonesia, Curzon Press, 2001, p. 168-169)



QUOTE
16. Anderson and McVey concluded that Sukarno, Air Force Chief Omar Dhani, PKI
Chairman Aidit (the three principal political targets of Suharto's anti-Gestapu
"response") were rounded up by the Gestapu plotters in the middle of the night,
and taken to Halim air force base
, about one mile from the well at Lubang Buaja
where the generals' corpses were discovered. In 1966 they surmised that this was
"to seal the conspirators' control of the bases," and to persuade Sukarno "to go
along with" the conspirators' plans (Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey, A
Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia
[Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1971], pp. 19-21). An alternative
hypothesis of course is that Gestapu, by bringing these men together against their
will, created the  semblance of a PKI-air force-Sukarno conspiracy which would
later be exploited by Suharto. Sukarno's presence at Halim "was later to provide
Sukarno's critics with some of their handiest ammunition" (John Hughes, The End of
Sukarno [London: Angus and Robertson, 1978], p. 54).


So now in your new fiction, the plotters "kidnapped" the President of Indonesia, the Air Force chief, and the whole PKI leadership? What a joke.

Why on earth would the air force chief Omar Dhani be "kidnapped" to his own HQ where there were battalions of air force soldiers under his command?

It is clear the president spend the night at his wife Haryati's house in Grogol, and during the day he went from Grogol to Halim on his own accord. Not only that, Sukarno held a CABINET MEETING in Halim AF Base with the attendence of twleve cabinet ministers and chiefs of navy, police, and air force. He later made one press release, and then drive to Bogor to spend the night. The idea that Sukarno was "kidnapped" to Halim is lunatic.

And how come Chairman Aidit and the whole PKI leadership can fly out freely to Central Java if he was "kidnapped".

Again, Ruth McVey worked for the PKI between 1962-1964. For her, PKI was the most innocent political party in Indonesia who can do no wrong. She is driven by hatred for Suharto for foiling Indonesia from becoming a communist state. No wonder in her fantasy stories pigs can fly. She has no credibility at all.

Seems like just like other communist pigs, you are still dreaming about how wonderful Indonesia will be if it became a communist country. Wake up, smell the coffee, look at how messed-up Yugoslavia and Soviet Union. Communism has been proven to be a redundant and false ideology.

Look at how many millions of people perished in communist concentration camps, much more than victims of Holocaust. The cruelty of Stalin, Mao, Lenin, and Pol Pot made Suharto looks like an angel in comparison.

This post has been edited by purnomor: Jan 7 2006, 01:02 AM
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theaccidentaltou...
post Jan 7 2006, 01:55 AM
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QUOTE (purnomor @ Jan 6 2006, 10:52 PM)
...all your nonsense deleted...


I'm not answering anymore of your Q's purnomor, and not
even bother to read your official garbage either. I've seen
'em too many times.

Sorry, I have other fish I gotta fry. Why don't you just scoot
over and play in your own sandbox. Come back when you all
grown up in say..., 25 years from now.

TAT
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purnomor
post Jan 7 2006, 02:02 AM
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Nusantara
post Jan 7 2006, 02:21 AM
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In 1965 PKI might responsible for killing of the 7 army generals, but there are no justification for army for butchering 500 thousand to 1 millions Indonesians just in java island for retaliation toward PKI.

I could not imagine how mess Indonesia at that time?
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theaccidentaltou...
post Jan 7 2006, 03:07 AM
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The PBS series "Shadow Play" aired in 2002 included some
revelations from CIA declassified documents for that same
year. Among other things, one document specifically spelt
out the money being send to support the covert operation.

++++++DECLASSIFIED++++++++++

2 December, 1965
From Marshall Green,
US Ambassador, Jakarta,
to State Department, Washington

This is to confirm my earlier
concurence that we provide...
fifty million rupiahs...

The chances of detection or
subsequent revelation of our
support in this instance are as
minimal as any black bag operation
can be.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++

Links for some of the mini-videos could be found from this
following link:

url: thirteen.org/shadowplay/

All videos are in realMedia format, so make sure you have
Real Player or Real Alternative Player installed...


TAT
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purnomor
post Jan 7 2006, 03:35 AM
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QUOTE (Nusantara @ Jan 7 2006, 02:21 AM)
In 1965 PKI might responsible for killing of the 7 army generals, but there are no justification for army for butchering 500 thousand to 1 millions Indonesians just in java island for retaliation toward PKI.

I could not imagine how mess Indonesia at that time?
*


^ I agree, so many innocents were killed and so many more lives destroyed.

In 1948, PKI launched rebellion against nationalist Indonesian govt when it was still fighting the Dutch. PKI murdered thousands of nationalists and Islamic clerics. Although the rebellion was crushed with much bloodshed, PKI was allowed to re-form and rise like a phoenix in 1950s.

In 1965 after G30S/PKI, the nationalists and religionists ganged-up to cruelly wipe out the communists forever to ensure there won't be a repetition of 1948.

Ideological conflict is always the bloodiest. Out of the three main ideologies existing during independence, NASAKOM, the KOMUNIS has been wiped out in 1965.

Nowadays, a minority of the AGAMAIS is playing with violence against the NASIONALIS by covertly supporting terrorists who attacked minorities and foreign tourists. The nationalists are still peaceful, for they are determined that never again Indonesians will solve their ideological differences by violence. Let us hope that the majority AGAMAIS would stop looking the other way whenever there is terrorism, and instead start actively fight such violent ideology. And let us hope they do not develop funny ideas about forcing Indonesia to become Islamic state, an idea which none of them had dare to advocate openly.

These people should realise that history had shown, whoever try to overthrow secular Pancasila ideology, always met terrible fate.

Once we ended our terrorism problem, NATIONALISM MUST REIGN AS SUPREME IDEOLOGY. Once this happen, I think Indonesia's ideological problems would be over because out of the three ideologies, Pancasila nationalism is the most tolerant and the most suitable ideology for Indonesia.
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Nusantara
post Jan 7 2006, 04:01 AM
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QUOTE (purnomor @ Jan 7 2006, 03:35 AM)
Ideological conflict is always the bloodiest.


Only happened for uneducated people and happened in very few people butchering million of people without given oppurtunity to defend himself.
Javanese people among them who fit into it who did hundred of thousand messacre to their own people in the name of ideology different.

QUOTE
And let us hope they do not develop funny ideas about forcing Indonesia to become Islamic state, an idea which none of them had dare to advocate openly.


Aceh is islamic province and applied syariah law and they just cool with it and other Indonesian provinces do not bother with it. They just get away with it.

QUOTE
These people should realise that history had shown, whoever try to overthrow secular Pancasila ideology, always met terrible fate.


Why we need ideology?
European countries becoming modern not using ideology but by law, people free to affiliate any politic ideology he prefer. In one country each law can be different within each states depend on the need and depend on the bahaviour of local people.

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purnomor
post Jan 7 2006, 04:11 AM
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QUOTE (Nusantara @ Jan 7 2006, 04:01 AM)
Only happened for uneducated people and  happened in very few people butchering million of people without given oppurtunity  to defend himself.
Javanese people among them who fit into it who did hundred of thousand messacre to their own people in the name of ideology different.


Remember World War II and the Holocaust? This very destructive ideological battle was started and done by highly-educated Europeans. Remember, Nazi ideology was created by Germans (most educated people in Europe).

BTW, the 1965 anti-communist massacres did not only occur in Java, bloodbath also happened in large-scale in Aceh, North Sumatera, Lampung, Bali, North Sulawesi, South Sulawesi, West Timor, and West Borneo where the local ethnic-Chinese were head-hunted by Dayaks (see Cribb, Historical Atlas of Indonesia, 2001, Curzon Books)

QUOTE
Aceh is islamic province and applied syariah law and they just cool with it and other Indonesian provinces do not bother with it. They just get away with it.

Aceh is special case because of its long history of violence.

QUOTE
European countries becoming modern not using ideology but by law. In one country each law can be different within each states depend on the need and depend on the bahaviour of local people.
*


European countries started WWI and WWII (most destructive wars in human history) out of their ideological differences. It took the horrors of WWII (particularly the Holocaust) to destroy Europeans' ideological fanaticism.
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Nusantara
post Jan 7 2006, 04:31 AM
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QUOTE (purnomor @ Jan 7 2006, 04:11 AM)
Remember World War II and the Holocaust? This very destructive ideological battle was started and done by highly-educated Europeans. Remember, Nazi ideology was created by Germans (most educated people in Europe).

BTW, the 1965 anti-communist massacres did not only occur in Java, bloodbath also happened in large-scale in Aceh, North Sumatera, Lampung, Bali, North Sulawesi, South Sulawesi, West Timor, and West Borneo where the local ethnic-Chinese were head-hunted by Dayaks (see Cribb, Historical Atlas of Indonesia, 2001, Curzon Books)
Aceh is special case because of its long history of violence.
European countries started WWI and WWII (most destructive wars in human history) out of their ideological differences. It took the horrors of WWII (particularly the Holocaust) to destroy Europeans' ideological fanaticism.
*


Germans did not butcher Germans. Not every single German were Nazi and the nazi German did not butcher non Nazi german just because they were different ideology point of view.

in 1965 there were bloodbath happened outside Java island toward PKI And also it was lead by Army.

Dayak is primitive people and still they proved it again few years back.

I am thinking Indonesian should be much better now if It was lead by civilized civilian after Soekarno era and not by military dictator who taking advantage of the mess.
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purnomor
post Jan 7 2006, 04:40 AM
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QUOTE (Nusantara @ Jan 7 2006, 04:31 AM)
Germans did not butcher Germans. Not every single German were Nazi and the nazi German did not butcher non Nazi german just because they were different ideology point of view.


Actually, the Nazis wiped out the German Jewry and communists. More than 200 thousand German soldiers and civilians were executed by their own side for not being fanatic enough Nazi. After 1944 Hitler assassination attempt, Nazis killed 250,000 Germans who did not show enough loyalty to Hitler.

QUOTE
in 1965 there were bloodbath happened outside Java island toward PKI And also it was lead by Army.


It was also led by Islamic clerics, Christian priests, and Hindu priests.

QUOTE
Dayak is primitive people and still they proved it again few years back.


What about Acehnese? Did you watch "Puisi Tak Terkuburkan" by Garin Nugroho, it tells true story of Ibrahim Kadir, suspected communist in Aceh arrested and tortured in jail by Acehnese police for 22 years.

QUOTE
I am thinking Indonesian should be much better now if It was lead by civilized civilian after Soekarno era and not by military dictator who taking advantage of the mess.
*


Maybe, but none were available or capable at that time.

This post has been edited by purnomor: Jan 7 2006, 06:40 PM
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LiuMaiShenJian
post Jan 7 2006, 03:27 PM
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The following excerpt discussion from Simaqian History Discussion forum might be helpful for further discussions :

http://www.simaqianstudio.com

This is basically the full excerpt of their discussion about G30S PKI (Suharto and it's involvement with CIA to replace Soekarno).
Very interesting discussions, facts, questions, answers with many holes yet still unanswered

-----------------------------------------------

Credit to Mr. X at Simaqian history forum

POST 1

Credit to Mr. X at Simaqian history forum


Quote:
Hi,

I am new to this forum.

I've learnt from several people that Soeharto, the ex-president of Indonesia, came into power because of CIA (US) involvement. Apparently, CIA had been trying to assasinate Soekarno, the previous president, several times unsuccessfully.

CIA and Soeharto then somehow created a conspiracy to take over the power from Soekarno by blaming the September 30, 1965 incident, to the Communist party (which at the time was one of the biggest in Asia after the Chinese Communist party under Mao, and the Vietnamese Communist party) and as a result, eliminate and ban the Communist party in Indonesia, and led to one of the biggest massacres commited in the world forgotten by the media and the world altogether. Over 500,000 people were killed over the period of several months and more followed as Soeharto gradually, with the support of CIA, took the power away from Soekarno and put him into house arrest. And later, Soekarno died during the house arrest, but the general public in Indonesia believed he was assassinated by the CIA or Soeharto.

I would like to know if there's an disclosed public announcement by the CIA out there that would support this Indonesian recent history ? Supposedly, CIA publishes new public disclosure every 20 or 30 something years about their involvements or other important affairs they have involved with.

Further, does anyone in this board know anything about this and could enlighten me with more info, data, websites, back up ?

Thanks

---------------------------

POST 2

by a member

Quote:
Hello & welcome, X. For a start, go to: http://www.antenna.nl/wvi/eng/ic/pki/dav/da3.html

Just type in appropriate keywords, in this case such as "cia suharto" to your favorite search engine - you'll get plenty of hits.

-----------------------------

POST 3

by Mr X

Thank you so much for the link. It's a good url with tons of important information.

However, do you know any link to CIA websites with all their disclosure of covert actions in South East Asia the 30-40 years ago.

Also, are you familiar with this subject at all ? Do you really think this all happened. There are many things happened in Asia and being ignored by the Western world - the Communist Massacre in Indonesia (1965), the Japanese WWII massacre of South East Asian civilliants, especially their sadistic treatment of women in South East Asia, China, and Korea.

--------------------------

POST 4

by Undisclosed member

Hello, X. I don't know a CIA link offhand - just type "central intelligence agency" into your search engine, you will turn up something useful.

I'm not very familiar with the history of Indonesia.

If you do enough reading you will gradually get a sense of what took place & what accounts are reliable.

Naturally any kind of official or semi-official government-published
material has to be used with great caution. In general, independent scholarship is the most trustworthy.

There are a number of reasons why some historical events have not been well publicized in the West. Racism & ethnocentrism are two. Africa, Asia, & Latin America are normally at the bottom of the list for news coverage here.

Over 30,000 civilians were killed recently in a UNITA rebel seige of an Angolan city, an event that went virtually unregarded in the US mainline media.

Another reason for large chunks of modern history being "missing" is that events involving war crimes & crimes against humanity committed by Washington, US corporations, & "Allied" states are in effect banned from our commercial media.

In other cases, the details were not known until some time later. There is a recent book out in the US titled THE RAPE OF NANKING, detailing Japanese military atrocities in that Chinese city.

This book has received a lot of publicity, which tends to further obscure the role of Western occupation & domination of China, including how Britain forced the importation of opium.

Western aggression against China for the sake of corporate profits caused the rise of Chinese Communist resistance & contributed to the ruinous Southeast Asian Wars following WWII.

But a book retailing the sins of the Japanese naturally sells much better in the US market than one which implicates the West in some responsibility for its own problems.

Our basic insecurity & megalomania drive us to believe that we are the "good guys" & are never wrong; we blame others for all of our difficulties. For that delusion we pay a high price.

-------------------------------------------
POST 5

GREAT REPLY BY KEWL, a Historian


Quote:
That's a very interesting proposition, historians here are trying to solve a lot of the vagueness surrounding the down fall of Soekarno. There are several main schools of thought on the 65' coup:

- That Soeharto, backed by the CIA, instigated a coup (done by men from under his tutelage) and then blammed it on the communists.

-That Soekarno supported the communist to launch a coup to exterminate 'western' elements in the army

-That it wasn't a coup, but a power struggle between factions in the military. The 'coup' here was done not by anyone of high ranking in the military, rather by those middle ranking elements...

There is another explanation that I couldn't remember right now.

But some interesting things: Soekarno immediately left the palace to Halim Airport, that the communist party leaders were unsure of what to do and had, while generally and vaguely, supported the coup, not seem to know a thing, that the main perpetrator, Untung, is actually known as a subordinate of Soeharto during the Irian campaign, and that of the 10 high ranking officials targeted for assasination, Soeharto was next in line in the command ladder, but was never targeted. Unfortunately the leader of the communist, Aidit, was murdered when the soldiers found him hiding in his native village, so there was never any confirmation that the communist was indeed behind the coup.

The coup was done by several middle ranking men in the army (the only branch of the military that had few communist sympathysers, not like the navy and air force). It was done in Jakarta and Yogyakarta and was to kidnap a number of high ranking army officers that were thought to be in touch with the CIA to plot a coup to wrest power from Soekarno.

The generals were killed and their bodies dumped inside a well. They also took over the Radio station and some government buildings. The coup was exterminated by the military in just one day!! Under the only person in Jakarta high enough to command the army, Soeharto, he had single handedly quell down the coup. That's the strange thing about the coup. Were it an operation done by the communist, it couldn't have been that sloppy. They had millions of followers not to mention those in the military and the government. I doubt the communist was the one that had done this... but unfortunately it is still an open book.

There is another perplexing thing around the giving of the Supersemar letter by Soekarno to Soeharto, which essentially gave power of the government to Soeharto. Some unveriviable sources says that it was conducted under duress, under a gunpoint. Soekarno was exiled inside his palace (such was his charisma that Soeharto didn't dare to touch him), brokenhearted, he died alone.

There is a good book on the massacre of communists here, unfortunately its in bahasa indonesia... The main massacre seemed to have been Java, especially in the Islamic area of East Java and the island of Bali.

----------------------------

POST 6

Another speculations and replies by Mr. X


Quote:
Thanks for the reponse kewlcity.

I still have several questions linger in my mind regarding the Sept 30 GESTAPU in Indonesia. But from what I've gathered this should be the explanation to it.

1) First of all, the only possible explanation would be Soeharto was backed by the CIA. At the time, the West, especially US was very concerned about the rapid spread of Communism. Cuba was one hour away from the Continental USA (Florida), USSR and China were the two big Communist countries and Vietnam was adopting fast, and the US went the distance by blocking the spread of Communism by entering to the Vietnam War. Indonesia is obviously next on the list. Soekarno might not be a Communist, but he's obviously giving the West a hard time. In fact, Soekarno and several other third world country leaders, such as Nehru of India, were building a new coalition (I believe known as Non-Bloc organization). It's bad enough the US had to deal with Communism. If the rouge nations such as India, Srilanka, African countries, and other South East Asian nations built another coalition, the situation would be much harder to control.

2) Soeharto might had been the leader of KOSTRAD. But how powerful was that ? After all, according the research I did, he was penalized for making illegal trades with an Overseas Chinese, by the name of Liem Soe Liong and Bob Hassan (Both were later on became two of the richest Conglomerates in Indonesia and Soeharto's closest cronies). Surely, when Nasution, who was the highest rank Military official, who had a different believe than A. Yani (another Military top official), found out, he removed Soeharto from his power and sent him to Yogya or Semarang (not sure). But in several years prior to the Sept 30 GESTAPU, Soeharto was able to creep back into the Military power and had the power in KOSTRAD. But really, how powerful this KOSTRAD at this time ?
Come on.. Soekarno was the true leader, he's basically the voice of the Indonesian people. A Yani was also another true hero and was the top guy in the military. And the six or seven Generals who was murdered in during the coup was also in support of A Yani, which in turn, was a Sokarno loyalist. The only other Supporter that Soeharto might had was Nasution. But Nasution was higher in Military rank than Soeharto was and didn't Nasution have his own ambition ?

3) Next, the military fractions were divided into two. But the actual situation was more complicated than that. Soekarno himself was not really a pro-Communist, but he liked the presence of Communist because Indonesia could utilize its presence as a balance of power from the American subversion and influences. On top of that, Soekarno would have more leverage to ask for aid and fund from Russia or China. A Yani was not a Communist either, but he was a true loyalist to Soekarno, and therefore supported his believe. Soeharto, on the other hand, I believe had a bad blood with Soekarno and Nasution was a pro CIA Military official. So, both need CIA's backing in terms of financials, funds, logistics, and other necessary means to perhaps get rid of Soekarno.

What I am not clear of is Nasution. Why would he help Soeharto ? Was he in an agreement with Soeharto to create the Sept 30 GESTAPU and later divide the power btwn the both of them. But Soeharto being the smarter one, decided to keep him quiet all those time by immediately put him into a house arrest ? But Nasution had more power than Soeharto at this time, why couldn't he use his power to outmanuver Soeharto ?

4) It's clear that Soeharto uses his own men or at least, utilize his CIA backing to create the Sept 30 GESTAPU, and made it seemed like the Communist was behind it. But again, I didn't quite understand how Soeharto, only being the head of KOSTRAD, could have eliminated the entire Communist party and its organization ? The communist party was one of the largest parties in Indonesia at the time. Their members were spread out everywhere in the military and government. How could Soeharto, all of the sudden, be that powerful ? The Communist party had the power and men necessary to retaliate as well, so why couldn't they do this ? KOSTRAD was not a large division of the Indonesian military. And most of Soekarno loyalist, including the Air Force still had a chance to retaliate. Some Indonesian historians said, it is because Soekarno was a True Nationalist. He didn't want to create a civil war in Indonesia. Instead, he decided to follow along, and just gave in to Soeharto.

But do you really think that this is the truth ? After all, Soekarno just declared himself as President for Life. And from all his past political career history, he seemed to be an ambitious guy who always stood up for his rights. Yes, he's a loyalist but I think he had his own ego as well. So, what actually happened between 1965 to 1967 ? How in the world did Soeharto with his cunning and brilliant strategies, were able to control and eliminate all the Communist fractions in the military and government, contain Nasution, control the media, control young University students of Indonesia, and finally corner Soekarno and strip him from all the power, which was known as the March 11 Letter of Supersemar.

All this time, obviously, Soeharto still maintained illegal trades with his long-term Chinese cronies to finance his activities and off course, get fund and all necessary support from the CIA. There's no doubt about that, because Indonesia immediately became quiet supporter of US right after Soeharto took the office. The US during this time, also orchestrated the Rupiah downfall which led to the cutting of the Rupiah and finally, the riots and mass economic struggle during this time, and led the University students and young Indonesians to believe that Soekarno was not doing his job the way he should

However, I still couldn't believe what happened during these last two years of Soekarno's reign. He was slowly but swiftly dismissed from all his might by Soeharto, which was unheard of at the time. And yet, none of his supporters or the Indonesian people stood up and supported the father of Indonesian independence. There's a missing piece somewhere, and I want to know what it is. I wish I could ask Soeharto himself.

Any insights ? suggestions ? ideas ?


------------------------------------

POST 7

Final Reply by KEWL, the historian


Quote:

Hi Mr X.

I'm sorry for the delay in my reply, I've been busy with the coming exams and papers to write...

Your right about the suspicions on Soeharto. He was just a Kostrad leader, but the real issue is really the weakness of Soekarno, in my opinion. There was a general and widespread discontent at his rule, and even though he was still looked on by the commoner with his/her utmost respect, students, intellectuals and artists, not to mention strong parts of the community had already given up hope on him.

His Nasakom, the doctrine by which communists have succesfully infiltrated formerly non-communists areas of lives have provoked a large antipathy toward them, and thus toward him.

The economy was in shambles, with a 600 % inflation rate at the peak of the crisis and long rice lines in Jakarta and other cities. I think he realised what a precarious position he was in and thus had to act carefully.

I think why Nasution had not taken over the leadership, while he was in a position to do so, was the fact that he was not a Javanese. Indonesia had never had a non-Javanese president even til now. He might have thought that he could control the wily Soeharto. But as history proves, the president that has earned him the nickname 'the devious dalang (puppet master)' has outwit a lot of his enemies.

And there is something you have to say about Soeharto: he was pretty smart. Sure 32 years was helped by proficient amount of western funding and a stable and growing economy, but he had a lot of manouvering to do to place him in a position (a position that many consider as being less of an absolute despot, than some wily general that had to keep the power balance in order) as the dictator of Indonesia.

You've made some great argument on that, I have to do some research on it to answer you satisfactorily, so sorry for my sparse comment. It isn't my area of interest.

Yes, it is a very bizzare thing that happened to the communist. I think what happened was that they were stunned at the event and hadn't time to act in a very confusing and fast event.

Aidit, while supporting the 'coup', hadn't seemed to know what was going on. In fact, none of the top communists leaders seemed to have known what was going on. Unfortunately, Aidit was murdered in his home village, so the extent of the communist involvement is still in the dark (I don't think they had any, really).

But again, the resentment toward the communist was real and it was felt. During the days after the coup, communists were blamed a wide spectrum of the community. Their headquarter was burned down by a mob. It was a free for all for non-communist to attack (first using words) at the communist party. The Nasakom had made communist an enemy of many people, thus aside from the traditional muslims, they gained many socialists, nationalists, artists and other people as enemies.

As they knew that the situation was unfavourable to them, they might have thought it better to lay low. A strange thing was that there were a lot of communists elements (especially in central java) that had wanted to act right away, at least to try to defend the communists from the accusations spewed by their enemies. Unfortunately it wasn't fortcoming from the communist leadership, and the only one that had feebly defended the communists was Soekarno himself.

The shadowy event leading to the transfer of power from Soekarno to Soeharto, the Supersemar event, is still a very vague thing that historians are still unsure of.

There are some who say that Soeharto held a gun to Soekarno's head and demanded him to sign it. There are also some that say that the letter never existed (it doesn't exist now, lost somewhere as the formal answer). But the letter contained the effective giving of power to Soeharto and that was done in aftermath of the coup.

So while Soekarno stayed on for two years as 'president', he was ineffectual and shunned. Soeharto had managed to destroy the many communists then posted in many parts of the government and the military was the result of the fact that there was a great trust in him to clear the mess up by a large proportion of the community.

People had cheered for Soeharto because they feel that Soekarno has failed in producing a healthy and prosperous nation. Also because his cold-war politics were considered unproductive and hurtful to this poor nation.

We still love Soekarno, even when he was at his weakest, even when people had cheered at his downfall, the nation slowly wept also. So much so that Soeharto did not dare to touch a hand on him. He was confined to his palace and died broken-hearted and lonely.

Even today we still love Soekarno. How could we not, he was the founder of the nation. He is still looked on today as that 20s engineer graduate, that fiery orator that had defended the nation against the Dutch (when the nation did not even existed yet) in his trial for inciting hatred toward the authorities that had launched his political carreer, still brimming with passion and ideals, with that third world dream of nationality that had been such a failure for many...

And we could never love Soeharto, even though Soeharto had build the nation, even though under his rule the economy prospered and people got richer. He was like a snake, taking advantage of situations, with no respect toward anything ideal. He was just too pragmatic and cold hearted, no spark, no charisma...
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purnomor
post Jan 7 2006, 06:44 PM
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^ I think CIA is overrated.
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