The days of U.S. military dominance in the Asian continent will be over. In addition to stealth fighters program, nuclear submarine developments, etc....China already has a roboust anti satellite and probably has anti ship ballistic missile that can strike moving naval ships and moving aircraft carriers with accuracy and has a reasonable good chance to break through the Aegis defense and SM-3 missile defend shield. A workable anti ship ballistic missile is far more dangerous
than Sunburns, Yakhonts, Russian supersonic missiles....
Basically, chinese sources, some authoritative ones claim that the seeker/radar technology for the warhead to hit a satellite in space(a satellite is not that big, i think that weather satellite is about the size of a refrigerator) is the same technology used for the ASBM. The DF-21D ASBM(maybe the DF-15 is for ASBM as well) and the DF-25B incorporates countermeasures, penetration against AEGIS, radar guidance, manuerable warheads, etc....

It should be noted that china's best military technology, the cream of the crop of its defense industry, is the missile/ballistic missile technology. Chinese missiles for the most part were always excellent, even before modernization and draws from 50+ years of experience. Laser technology is up there as well. Pretty smart, concentrating immense resources to what you are really good at already to strike enemy weakness. Trump cards, game changer weapons.

Asymmetric warfare is the way to go against the mighty large u.s. forces. there is no way any other country can take on america using numbers, fighter vs. fighter, sub vs. sub, ship vs. ship. the other way to is to punch the united states eyes out and take out satellites and something like a long range missile artillery that can bomb its naval ships and carriers from long range and lots of submarines.

ASBM will blow the living hell out of Japanese and south korean ships if they ever side with the u.s. against china. american naval ships and even super-carriers will suffer immense damager due to the size of the warhead and the kinetic impact at Mach 7-10(more or less).

Chinese sources suggest that this system is already in the early stages of initial operating status but more many more satellites and pieces and improvements will be added and over the next decade. China has spent immense money and resources to develop this system. The seeker/radar technology is the same for the anti satellite and antiship ballistic missile as china blew a satellite in January 2007. That was a direct hit hitting the size of a refrigerator. A naval ship, an aircraft carrier moves yet, but they are bigger, especially an AC. Some people think it is not possible, I say it is.

ASAT- in addition to KT-2, china plans to develop longer range capabiltiy to strike satellites in geo orbit, high orbit satellites as well. China also has a very large laser artillery field based in northwestern china high in the mountain areas.

i think chinese commanders and war planners don't want to go to war, but really want to beat the crap out of everyone capability and restore china to its mighty middle kingdom status.
the americans, japanese, and everyone else in asia in the future will need to bow down to the chinese.

Chinese ASBM DF-25 specifications

source: http://blog.ifeng.com/article/1643766.html

http://thetaiwanlink.blogspot.com/2009/06/...ry-on-anti.html


The DF-25 missile has been successfully researched and developed, is able to launch one or a number of warheads that are equipped with passive infrared terminal guidance. After warheads reenter the atmosphere, they are able to maneuver accurately toward the target.

但是美国海军计划对所有装备“宙斯盾”系统的62艘驱逐舰和22艘巡洋舰进行升级，使其具备弹道导弹防御能力。根据美军计划，到2009年美国海军将拥有18艘装备“弹道导弹防御型宙斯盾”系统的战舰，其中包括15艘驱逐舰和3艘巡洋舰。五角大楼水面战委员会主席维克托•吉尔罗伊少将15日表示，18艘反导宙斯盾舰远不够用，因此计划首先对所有的“阿利•伯克”级导弹驱逐舰进行升级，使其具备拦截弹道导弹的能力。随后22艘导弹巡洋舰的升级也将被列上日程。这对地区和平、尤其是东亚和台海安全构成了严重威胁。


But the U.S. Navy planned to upgrade Aegis system, including 62 destroyers and 22 cruisers for missile defense. According to the Navy plans, it will have 18 sea-based missile defense equipped ships, including 15 destroyers and 3 cruisers. A U.S. Navy committee argued that all Arleigh Burke’s should be upgraded. This presents a serious threat to regional peace, especially for security in East Asia and the Taiwan Strait.


从理论上说，如果美国全部宙斯盾战舰作战系统都升级为“导弹防御型宙斯盾”，这样一支反导舰队集中部署在一个方向，将可以同时拦截500枚以上的中程弹道导弹。

Theoretically speaking, if America assembled all its Aegis assets together, they could intercept more than 500 medium range ballistic missiles at one time.

从拦截区域上看，海基拦截系统覆盖面积是“爱国者-3”反导系统的100倍；从技术成熟度上来看，目前海基拦截系统是美国所有能拦截中程弹道导弹的反导系统中拦截成功率最高的一种。
From the perspective of defended area, sea-based missile defenses cover an area 100 times larger than that of PAC-3. In terms of technology, sea-based missile defenses have had the highest success rates.

所以，东风－25弹道导弹采用了“隐形战术弹头”概念，以减少弹头在实施分导开始阶段的“雷达反应红外线” 特征，使得东风25导弹更加难以拦击。但要确保突破宙斯盾反导系统从而达到击沉航母的目的，还是有很大难度的。

Therefore, the DF-25 incorporates a “tactical stealth warhead” concept in order to reduce the “radar reaction infrared” (awkward wording in Chinese that is hard to translate), when the warhead is in the initial phase of payload separation, and make the DF-25 hard to intercept. But it’s still difficult to ensure the ability of missile to penetrate the Aegis missile defense system and destroy the carrier target.

故中国人民解放军在2006年提出了进一步研制新型弹道导弹，争取在3年内装备3种新型弹（目前定型为：东风25乙 东风26甲 东风26乙三型）。要求采用低轨分导式，既导弹升空后保持在20千米至30千米的低轨道飞行，不必重返大气层，使美军装备的“宙斯盾”海基拦截系统没有充足的反应拦截时间。
In accordance with a 2006 PLA proposal, R&D began on new ballistic missiles to be finished within three years (finalized designs include the DF-25B, DF-26A, and DF-26B). The requirement is to adopt a low trajectory with separable warheads, maintain a 20-30 kilometer altitude in order to not give Aegis destroyers sufficient time to respond.


{{Note: In a version posted on Sina.com a few days after the iFeng article, the language stresses a DF-26 sea-launch variant, rather than the surface-launched DF-25:

其中东风25乙为路基型，东风26甲为海基型，东风26乙的具体情况还不太清楚。

Roughly translated, “the DF-25B is ground-launched, the DF-26A is sea-launched, and specific details of the DF-26B aren’t clear.” }}

野战陆基型低轨分导式“航母末日”反航母导弹系统（即东风25乙）的部分性能指标：

Following is a general description for the ground-based, depressed trajectory, multiple warhead, “carrier killer” (literally “final days of the aircraft carrier”) ASBM system (specifically the DF-25B):
1.弹头数量：6枚分弹头

1. Number of warheads: Six

2.导弹飞行高度：20千米至30千米低轨机动飞行

2. Missile flight altitude: 20-30 kilometers, maneuvering, depressed trajectory

3.导弹射程：1300千米__1800千米

3. Missile range: 1300-1800 kilometers

4.机动发射准备时间：小于9分钟
4. Mobile launcher preparation time: Less than nine minutes

5.每枚弹头当量：450千克黑索今 (相当于1100千克TNT当量)

5. Individual warhead weight: 450kg explosive (equivalent to 1100kgs of TNT)

6.导弹飞行速度：8马赫__12马赫

6. Missile flight speed: Mach 8-12

7.弹头攻击角度：60度__90度俯冲攻击

7. Warhead angle of attack: Between 60-90 degrees diving attack


8.弹头飞行速度：6马赫__8马赫小动量变轨飞行
8. Warhead flight speed: Mach 6-8 with minor maneuvering


9. 弹头制导方式：红外; 自备激光群发; 可视电视; 图像记忆
9. Warhead Guidance: Infrared, self-equipped lasing (this is a tough one to translate); electro-optical; imaging

10. 弹头攻击方式：穿甲; 延时自爆

10. Warhead Attack Method: Armor piercing; delayed fuse

11. 弹头飞行距离：60千米
11. Warhead flight range: 60 kilometers


野战陆基型低轨分导式“航母末日”反航母导弹（东风25乙）具备隐身和超强抗各种干扰能力，发射准备阶段和距离航母舰队500千米前，利用GPS、北斗系统、低轨侦察卫星、天波雷达、地面监听站等设备对航母舰队进行连续跟踪，以保证飞行方向。距离航母舰队500千米时，弹载雷达设备自动寻的，对目标方位进行修正、定位。
Using stealth and ECCM, the ground-launched “carrier killer” ASBM (DF-25B) relies on GPS, Beidou, LEO satellites, OTH-B, and SIGINT sites to establish a continuous track during the launch preparation stage and up to 500 kilometers from the aircraft carrier group. At a range of 500 kilometers, the missile-borne radar starts its autonomous search for the target, and adjusting its direction and position in relation to the target.

其它性能：

Other Characteristics:



1．导弹母体在飞行中敌方雷达可探测距离小于100千米。
1. Enemy radars can detect the main missile body at a range of less than 100 kilometers.


2．导弹母体在释放出分弹头后，可在战区上空盘旋，为分弹头提供制导，并对航母舰队进行强电磁、电子压制。

2. After the main missile body releases warheads, it can loiter within the theater and provide warheads with guidance as well as conduct electronic countermeasures against the aircraft carrier battle group.

3．导弹母体保持200秒以上盘旋时间。

The main missile body can loiter for more than 200 seconds.

4．导弹母体保持200秒以上盘旋时间后，携带预留高燃剂以10马赫速度、90度直角俯冲攻击航空母舰。
4. After loitering for more than 200 seconds, the missile body can carry a reserve high energy propellant in order to achieve a speed of Mach 10 and dive toward the carrier at a 90 degree angle of attack.


5．导弹母体俯冲攻击航空母舰兼磁爆效应。
5．As it dives, it can have an electromagnetic explosive effect (difficult to translate).

另外，野战陆基型低轨分导式“航母末日”反航弹道母导弹（东风25乙）备有多种弹头



In addition, the ASBM (DF-25B) has several types of warheads:


1．高爆穿甲弹

High-explosive armor piercing shell

2．电磁炸弹


EMP Bomb

3．高爆穿甲燃烧弹
Highly explosive armor piercing incendiary shell


4．高爆子母弹
High explosive submunitions


5．声波弹
Acoustic warhead


6．诱饵弹
Decoys

前段时间国防大学军事专家张教授提出我国目前并不急于建造航空母舰的建议，原因很可能是知道反航母弹道导弹“航母末日”既将问世。

At previous times, NDU Professor Zhang raised that China shouldn’t rush to build aircraft carriers, because perhaps the “final days of the aircraft carrier” are going to become public.

陆基型低轨分导式“航母末日”可有效地将航空母舰阻挡在海岸线1000千米——1500千米外，并对进入“航母末日”有效射程范围内的敌舰予以毁灭性的打击。
Ground-based low trajectory, separable warhead ASBM could effectively prevent the aircraft carrier from crossing a 1000-1500 kilometer line. And also the ASBM will effectively enable us to destroy vessels that come within this range.

{{Note: In the Sina.com version, the final two paragraphs are substituted with the following discussion of the sub-launched DF-26 variant and a torpedo-like payload without any additional detail:

另外具可靠消息透露,中国军方正加紧开发新型“航母末日”专用超高速潜水高爆火箭弹头,取名“龙啸”。预计“龙啸”脱离母弹入水后的速度为500千米，水下航程80千米，爆炸当量达到900千克TNT.

In addition, according to reliable sources, the PLA is developing a special use underwater warhead referred to as the “Longxiao.” It’s estimated that the Longxiao would separate from the main missile body and enter the water at a range of 500 kilometers (Chinese says “speed” though), have an underwater range of 80 kilometers, and have 900kg of explosives.

美军方分析，因潜射型低轨分导式“航母末日”反航弹道母导弹弹体偏大，目前中方只有094型战略导弹核潜艇和在研的095型核攻击潜艇、096型战略导弹核潜艇能够搭载。由于094型、096型战略导弹核潜艇的定位不同，携带“航母末日”的数量在3枚以内；095型核攻击潜艇可携带“航母末日”的数量在8——10枚左右.

American sources claim that because the size of a sub-launched ASBM structure is large, only the 094 submarine, 095 submarine that’s in development, and the 096 submarine could serve as launch platforms. Because the positions of the 094 and the 096 subs aren’t the same, they can only carry three missiles or less. The 095 should be able to carry 8-10 missiles.

U.S. source on Chinese ASBM development:
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabri...Hash=31ceb95794

source:
http://china-pla.blogspot.com/2009_03_01_archive.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------
It looks like DF-21 is the missile that ASBM is based on. It uses a solid propellant, is road-mobile, widely deployed and also have recently been improved to DF-21C. It's range of around 2000 km would perfectly cover the areas where future conflict is likely to be fought. Its range also would cover most of the areas that China's OTH-B radar would cover. It is also large enough to carry a large warhead needed to inflict damage on carrier while also holding a more complex guidance/seeker. They have put a MaRV warhead on DF-21 for maneuverability. In order to improve the penetration capability, they have added a third stage to it to provide unpredictable movement (I think the blog described it as some kind of oscillation). They have apparently made modifications to the warhead in order to lower its radar signature. They have also added a new multi-mode seeker that apparently has an active, passive radar and infrared seeker (I'm not sure how that works). It didn't mention how the missile would counter ESM of the fleet except for improving the seeker and getting more updated info from the sources that provided it initial targeting data.

Source:
http://thetaiwanlink.blogspot.com/2009/06/...missile_17.html

DF-21 ABM:

Missile Defense Countermeasures. Citing a Northwest Polytechnical University and other studies, Qiu and Long believe that the ASBM would adopt sophisticated missile defense countermeasures against U.S. sea-based missile defenses, including masking of the ASBM solid fueled motor’s signature, mid-course maneuvering, decoys, coatings to reduce the warhead’s radar cross section (RCS), and on-board jamming. Equipped with a hybrid solid and liquid fueled third stage, mid-course maneuvering would involve a boost-glide or hopping trajectory concept (跳跃式弹道方案). The missile would incorporate a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) linked with inertial navigation for autonomous mid-course guidance, as well as a possible SAR/millimeter wave radar with passive infrared seeker for terminal guidance. At various stages of flight, the ASBM would adopt speed maneuvers, and means to manage blackout periods due to ionization of the atmosphere above certain re-entry speeds.

Countering U.S. Missile Defense Surveillance and Tracking. In their detailed ASBM vs. sea-based missile defense scenario, the analysis goes through the SBIRS alert process, arguing that SBIRS would not be able to establish an impact prediction point and thus could fail to provide cueing for sea-based missile defense radar systems. They make an argument that Ground Based Radar (GBR) systems in Korea and Japan likely would be unable to establish a track. The analysis also addresses possible attempts by the U.S. High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program (HAARP) in Alaska could fail to jam China’s OTH-B system, implying the system has a military role.

Order of Battle Issues. Finally, Qiu and Long assert that two DF-21 anti-ship capable brigades will be deployed, with six battalions each with a total of 17 launchers. It’s not clear if new conventional DF-21 brigades would be established, or if the ASBM DF-21 variants would be upgrades to existing brigades. At the current time, the PLA Second Artillery is said to have three DF-21 brigades in eastern China. Two are subordinate to the 52 Base, the army-level Second Artillery organization opposite Taiwan. These are the 96163 Unit, aka the 811 Brigade based in the Qimen area in Anhui; and the 96161 Unit, aka 807 Brigade in Chizhou area in Jiangxi province. Another relatively new unit subordinate to the 51 Base (the 96117 Unit, aka the 822 Brigade based in Laiwu, Shandong province). It could be assumed that the Second Artillery wouldn’t mix nuclear and conventional DF-21 variants in the same brigade. {{NOTE: Reliable Chinese references indicate that a standard DF-15 SRBM brigade has six battalions with two companies per battalion. While not yet clear, it appears that existing DF-21 MRBM brigades still consist of only three battalions. These may be the units with nuclear missions. As conventional DF-21 brigades are established, it's possible that they could be organized similar to DF-15 brigades}}.

KKTT: China’s Extended Range Precision Strike Capability

Qiu Zhenwei and Long Haiyan’s analysis is only one example. Another observer who appears to be closely following the program goes by the call sign of “KKTT.” Under normal circumstances, bulletin board system (BBS) postings should be taken with a grain of salt. However, when observers cite their research and analysis with credible sources, then they may be worth paying attention to. In his main analysis published in April 2009 (China’s Development Concept for Theater Missile Strike Power; or 我国区域常规打击力量建设设想), KKTT argues that an ASBM program entails three phases.

The author implies that China has already developed a 1700-2000 kilometer range DF-21D. However key technologies needed for precision strike against a sea target are still under development. The three systems under development are: the DF-25; the DF-26; and the DF-27. (NOTE: One commentator of unknown reliability notes that the DF-26 and DF-27 are being developed separately by CASIC and CASC and only one will be downselected). Other sources claim that the DF-26 is a developmental sea-launched conventional ballistic missile). The author notes that a sea-launched variant of the DH-10 land attack cruise missile with a range of 3000 kilometers is under development. Cruise missile designers have been advocating that China’s extended range LACMs be adapted for counter-carrier operations. According to KKTT’s analysis, all four systems are supposed to be tested and fielded before 2015.

A second phase would involve development of sophisticated aerodynamic maneuvering capability that not only would enhance a missile's ability to penetrate missile defenses but also extend its range. Currently in its preliminary research stage, a boost-glide missile (助推-滑翔式导弹), based on part on 1930s technology developed by German V-2 missile engineers, would move to the R&D stage only after 2015 with deployment before 2020. A final phase, deployed before 2025, would be a hypersonic cruise vehicle for global operations.

death to all the others!!

The Great Game in Space:
Source: http://project2049.net/documents/the_great_game_in_space.pdf

"Aside from the direct-ascent KKV China has successfully tested, it is also possible that
direct-ascent ASATs could be armed with the electro-magnetic pulse (nuclear or
non-nuclear) warheads that the PLA is also developing for its anti-ship ballistic missile
(ASBM) program, which is based upon similar technology as China’s ASAT program."

"
However, unsubstantiated
reports indicate that China is currently developing an improved variant of its basic
solid-fueled launch vehicle, designated the DF-25, that may eventually be able to
use a larger first-stage motor based on DF-31 Intermediate Range Ballistic
Missile/Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (IRBM/ICBM) technology, and an advanced
guidance package to target U.S. satellites in GEO. In the interim, China is developing
other ASAT technologies these GEO satellites may potentially be vulnerable to, such
as radio frequency, cyber and laser weapons systems.21
China has been devoting significant resources to directed-energy weapons systems"


China has been devoting significant resources to directed-energy weapons systems,
particularly ground-based lasers, and have used them to target U.S. reconnaissance
satellites. In August and September of 2006, China used high-powered, ground-based
lasers to blind or “paint” U.S. reconnaissance satellites on several occasions as they
passed over China. Reports stated that these were either ASAT tests or relatively
“low-power” laser ranging devices intended to precisely determine satellite orbits for
ASAT targeting purposes.22"

"According to one account, the “Chinese routinely turn powerful lasers skywards,
demonstrating their potential to dazzle or permanently blind spy satellites.” This report
went on to quote Gary Payton, a senior Pentagon official who said “They let us see their
lasers. It is as if they are trying to intimidate us.”23 According to a Hong Kong news
website, China has at least one very large “ASAT laser artillery” weapon deployed
somewhere in its North Western territory, possibly somewhere high in Xinjiang’s Tianshan
Mountains where there would be far less atmospheric interference to deal with.24"
"

China has also been developing (and in some cases fielding) cyber warfare units to hack
into space control systems; co-orbital ASAT systems to covertly disable enemy satellites;
radiofrequency weapons to jam satellite signals; and high-powered microwave weapons
to destroy satellites from Earth. Some of these systems have been in development for
over a decade, and the cyber warfare and laser programs are particularly mature.25 In
terms of co-orbital ASAT development, China’s recent BX-1 micro-satellite test, which was
carried out as a part of the manned Shenzhou-7 mission, demonstrated technology that
can be used as a base for future covert satellite inspection missions, as well as co-orbital
ASAT attacks. The BX-1 test was particularly notable for the fact that it pasted within 25
km of the International Space Station (ISS) in what may have been a simulated attack
run.26 In the near future, it is possible that China could use this technology to launch
co-orbital, micro-satellite ASAT weapons from its Xichang Satellite Launch Center (or Base
27) to attack U.S. national security satellites in GEO. Looking longer term, such weapons
could potentially be launched using road-mobile launchers as well. The summation of this
broad and assertive Chinese ASAT weapons program is a clear challenge to U.S. space
operations, and by way thereof, nearly all modern U.S. war fighting capabilities. This fact
has not gone unnoticed, especially in the Pacific theater of operations, where the U.S. is"